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METHODS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL CHANGE

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One of the most productive methods for the analysis of cultural change is that of dichotomizing contrasting characteristics (often abstract or ideal without actual examples in the real world) and ordering data on a continuum between the polar extremes. This method measures, essentially, social situations found in human social systems against ideal types.

This general method of analysis has been employed by the staff of the Cornell Peru Project for nearly a decade in studying the general process of cultural change in the Andean Indian community of Vicos, Department of Ancash, Peru, in order to furnish guidance in the order and techniques for introducing directed cultural changes. The aim of this paper is to present the basic concepts behind the particular interventions.

The most general dichotomy employed in analyzing changes at Vicos is that between modern, industrial Western Civilization and medieval Western colonialism. The Cornell Peru Project has viewed the changes occurring in Vicos society and culture as part of a process which has been thought of as "modernization" or "Westernization." No ideal type of Western Civilization has been set up for analytical purposes, but a working map of Western Civilization has been derived from empirical data in order to guide change in the direction which will enable the Vicosinos to achieve functional linkage with the greater social system which is mutually rewarding to them and to the other participants in the larger system in terms of maximal well-being and euphoria and minimal anxiety and frustration.

Modern Western Civilization is viewed by us as a specific culture shared by a large number of human beings residing in western Europe and North America and by at least the governing elites in South America and much of Africa, India and Asia. Like Arnold Toynbee, we view this specific civilization as having had a long historic development. We do not, however, view the contemporary process of Westernization as one which is controlled by

a unified core of religious belief and ethical concepts. We view the Western Civilization which is now changing non-westernized societies and cultures into its own image as a relatively secularized civilization of many historically recent antecedents. These are the general Protestant Reformation and the Catholic counter-reformation, the American revolution, the French revolution, the Industrial revolution, the medical revolution. This is to say that Western Civilization today is no longer the same as it was when Spain conquered the Inca Empire, and laid the colonial foundations of Peru.

Analysis of modern Western Civilization based on its impact on medieval type communities such as Vicos was reveals that new conventional understandings introduced into this culture during the past few centuries have not completely displaced earlier conventional understandings which appear to be functionally equivalent. These last survive as alternatives in Linton's terms. These cultural alternatives reflect, in a word, cultural changes within Western Civilization through time.

To illustrate this change, we may consider the relationship of the Roman Catholic church to religious festivals. Roman Catholic missionaries have captured pagan festivals by equating them with Catholic feast days for many centuries—St. Augustine was instructed to employ this conversion technique in heathen Britain in 604 A. D. (Jeffreys 1956). Dance, dramas, feasting and other components of the medieval religious festival were employed by Roman Catholic priests and laymen for the Westernization of New World Indians during the colonial period so the colonial church fused Catholic and pagan traits. Today, North American Roman Catholic missionaries working in Latin America devalue the traditional festival (Considine 1958, Spitzer 1958) and substitute formal parochial school education as the primary institution of Westernization in the new sense of modernization.

Alternatives exist even at the deeply significant level of *fundamental assumptions*, our label for those conventional understandings which provide societies with their characteristic cultural orientations.

The present process of Westernization of non-western peoples seems to us, then, to be one of introducing modern fundamental assumptions into cultures previously lacking them, so that they assume the status of at least cultural alternatives, to functionally

equivalent but different fundamental assumptions preexisting in non-western cultures.

The present process of modernization within Western Civilization and ethnic enclaves not completely westernized, seems, in the same vein, to be one of shifting modern fundamental assumptions toward the position of cultural universals, to the detriment of surviving functionally equivalent older fundamental assumptions that produce very different social consequences.

Holmberg (1960) has previously stated as one of the fundamental assumptions of Latin American society the concept of individual inequality. The staff of the Cornell Peru Project has consistently fostered changes in the subculture of the Vicos community which reflected a fundamental assumption of individual equality. The fundamental assumption expressed in Project interventions may be stated:

Every adult is entitled to egalitarian citizenship.

The most important corollary of this assumption is that egalitarian citizenship requires a distribution of governmental authority which bears equally upon and is equally accessible to every citizen.

This concept of egalitarian citizenship has been an alternative fundamental assumption of Western Civilization since at least classical Greek times, but the extension of citizenship in this sense to all adults in a social system is a relatively modern one.

The functionally equivalent fundamental assumption, that happens to be antithetical to the one just stated and to compete with it in ordering human relations, may be stated:

All adults are inherently of different quality from each other in their social characteristics.

The most important corollary of this assumption is the behavior Holmberg cited as typical of Latin America, the hierarchical ranking of individuals so that certain individuals wield immense authority over others, and access to authority is very unequally distributed in the population of a social system organized in terms of this principle.

This fundamental assumption is easily recognized as the one governing the structure of the Inca Empire under which the ancestors of the people of Vicos lived for some centuries. It also governed the conquest and colonization of Peru by Spain. Even during the republic, the life of the Vicosinos and many other

Peruvians has been very different from that of the people in other modernized sections of Western Civilization.

The contrasting effects of the operation of alternative fundamental assumptions may be seen quite clearly in the change fostered in the culture of Vicos by the Cornell Peru Project.

The phraseology of the effectuators of the North American revolution may be borrowed to express the operationalization of the fundamental assumption of egalitarian citizenship. First, *the citizen is entitled to life*.

One aspect of the right to life involves freedom from arbitrary execution by government, by a murderer, or by mob violence (as happened to some *hacendados* during the Bolivian revolution). This is an aspect of life in Vicos which has stimulated one of the most fundamental changes—that of the landholding and labor system itself. In order to safeguard the Vicosinos against being shot by the forces of public order as is quite possible, given the social conditions of the large landed estate system of the Peruvian highlands, and in order to prevent the renter or *hacendado* of Vicos from being lynched by his angry peasants, the Project has tried to change Vicos from an hacienda into a free community, so that neither serfs nor renter exist there any longer. In order to achieve this fundamental change in the social system, the Project asked and the Peruvian government acceded to the expropriation of the estate from the Public Benefit Society of Huaraz for the Vicosinos, although the proceedings have not been concluded at this time.

The program of culture change has reduced the sources of conflicts that might become occasions for mob action at various other points. The diffusion to Vicos of the custom of school students making visits to other schools in the area has noticeably changed the attitude of young Vicosinos toward strangers. Previously, the Vicosinos lacked trust in strangers and rather feared them, so that they were quite timid. Visits to Vicos by pupils and teachers from many other schools and reciprocal visits by Vicos schoolchildren has given the latter trust in strangers so that they have lost much of their timidity. The Project has, moreover, reduced the sources of conflict within the community, such as arguments over animal ownership. Such disputes, which previously were the main cause for physical aggression between Vicosino families and quite fre-

quent, were almost entirely eliminated by the introduction of the use of brands and a brand-register.

In terms of modern Western Civilization, the right to life implies freedom from disease-induced mortality through effective access to modern Western (i.e., experimental, empirical) medicine. The Vicosinos had not enjoyed much benefit from such medicine before June of 1954 when the Project obtained the aid of the Pativilca-Huaraz-Huaylas Program of the Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare and began a basic study of customs and beliefs related to health, and disease treatments of the Vicosinos. The first weekly clinics attracted an attendance of 40 to 50 adults and infants in 1955. This organization added a dentist to its team in 1957. Later, the Nucleo Escolar added a Medical Supervisor to its staff. As a result of such medical attention, the Vicosinos built a modern clinic for the Vicos-Recuayhuanca Rural Health Center inaugurated in mid-1957.

Besides encouraging treatment of the Vicosinos, the Project has fostered the adaptation of modern medicine to the special circumstances of the area. Since western medicine is firmly based upon experimentation and exact observation of the nature of man, the Project collaborated with a team from Parke-Davis and Company and the Ministry of Public Health in carrying out a study of parasitology in Vicos, the first made in an indigenous community of Peru. For the same reason, the Project worked with the Department of Nutrition of the Ministry of Public Health in starting a study of Vicos nutrition and with Dr. Marshall T. Newman of the Smithsonian Institution in beginning a study of physical maturation among Vicosinos, and conducting a long-range study of nutritional factors related to growth.

A second operationalization of the egalitarian citizenship assumption is the concept that *the citizen is entitled to liberty*. This may be further operationalized as freedom from arbitrary imprisonment by the state or another person or agency, freedom to enjoy privacy, and freedom from forced labor. Although there are *hacendados* in the Peruvian highlands who have their private jails in which they are able to arbitrarily imprison their serfs, this can no longer occur at Vicos since the social system there has changed to a democratic form and today the Vicosinos are subject to national law more or less like any other citizen (assuming

that the Peruvian government solves the problem of completing the expropriation of the estate so that it does not again become an hacienda). As for forced labor, obligatory labor exists in Vicos now only as a form of tax.

Before the changes wrought by the Project, the social structure of the hacienda was typically hierarchical. The social structure produced by generations of owners and renters behaving in terms of the functionally equivalent fundamental assumption of inherent inequality placed them at the top of an administrative pyramid. Since they seldom lived at Vicos, the renters employed foremen to boss the people, the foremen commanded their assistants and the Vicosino field foremen known as *tápacos*. This social pyramid existed in order to exploit the forced labor of the serfs holding subsistence fields, since the latter owed 156 days of labor each year without further recompense than 20 centavos per day with which to purchase coca. The Vicosinos were, moreover, obliged to render in turn certain free services to the hacienda and its employees as cooks, waiters and servants. The Project did away with these latter obligatory services from its start, substituting for them paid, voluntary labor. The improvement in agricultural technology and the termination of the exploitation of Vicosino labor by renting it out, has reduced the labor tax to only 48 days per person during the agricultural season of 1957-1958, for example, or a little less than one third of the forced labor exacted seven years earlier. Thus the liberty of the Vicosino has increased.

Yet another aspect of the right to life and liberty is the freedom from want, or an adequate food supply, clothing, and shelter to maintain the organism. Since Vicos was when the Project began an agricultural community with technical knowledge of little else than agriculture, the Project had to begin and base its program of cultural change upon the improvement of agriculture with the technical assistance of the staff of the Servicio Cooperativo de Producción de Alimentos. For the first time, perhaps, since the conquest, the Vicosinos received instruction from the estate management in the improvement of their harvests on their small, frequently steeply sloping fields which they were assigned in return for their 156 days of obligatory labor for the renter.

The attempt to change agriculture was concentrated first on potatoes, introducing new seeds of the highest quality, the sale of

fertilizers, insecticides, the machines with which to apply them, and some new methods of soil preparation and planting. The first year only 17 family heads participated in the training program in the new technology of potato production, but 85 took part the second year and 180 sought to participate during the third year. Afterwards it was necessary to limit the number of participants to 158 in the fourth year. In 1955 the Project introduced to some 72 Vicosinos a system of agricultural credit new to them of lending improved seed, guano and insecticides and requiring the repayment of their value in cash, thus fostering a change from only subsistence production to commercial production.

The training in the modern technology of potato cultivation given to the Vicosinos by the Project prepared them sufficiently for them to be able to conduct their agricultural enterprises since 1957 with credit from the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario del Peru, technical supervision and education from SCIPA, and the advice of the Project on the socio-economic aspects, realizing a net profit of 137,072.96 soles in the 1957-58 season. Thus, the new social and economic system at Vicos not only avoids violence, but also contributes positively to the wider sharing of the social values most desirable for the country, since this profit provides the community with funds equivalent to taxes in foreign communities that enjoy the power of taxation which can be invested in the development of the community, and since the agricultural product increases the national supply and lowers the price to the consumer.

Liberty in a cultural sense also implies that free citizens shall be able to choose between cultural alternatives on the basis of an adequate knowledge and understanding of the alternatives which are available and of their consequences. This means in modern Western Civilization that the state of other public entity finances free, compulsory public education of children to prepare them to behave wisely enough to preserve their freedom as adults.

The system of large landed estates requires very few educated serfs and not many existed in Vicos when it was an hacienda although the Peruvian government supported a small school whose student body rarely exceeded eighteen or twenty under a single teacher. From the beginning, the Project has concentrated considerable effort on changing the educational situation, investing funds realized from hacienda operation in books, pencils, chalk,

soccer equipment, etc. It enlisted the assistance of the Vicosinos in making new desks. It distributed a dish of food at lunch time and enrollment increased from 20 to 60. On July 20, 1952 the first wing of the new school was inaugurated, consisting of three classrooms and offices for the administration, secretariat and committees, and library, erected at a cost of approximately 70,000.00 soles. Enrollment increased to 123 of both sexes in charge of two teachers. A night class in reading for adults began to function in July of 1953. Attendance reached a maximum of 90 pupils per day, all voluntary, in 1953, with three classes of "transition."

A second wing of an auditorium, dining room, kitchen, three classrooms and shop was ready for the 1954 school year. One hundred twenty-seven boys and 33 girls enrolled, and average daily attendance was 80 in four transition classes and one first grade class. The school was classified as a rural prevocational school in August and a carpenter and additional teacher added to the staff in October as evidence of the cooperation of the Ministry of Education.

An industrial technician and agricultural instructor were added in 1955 and average daily attendance neared 100 pupils in three transition sections, one first and one second grade.

A Nucleo Escolar was created at Vicos on July 1, 1957, with a director, central school director, top category normal school graduate, three rural normal school graduates, two agricultural technicians, a carpenter, a blacksmith, and kindergarten teacher. In 1958 the Nucleo had a director and three supervisors in agriculture and economics, sanitation, and literacy. Pupil attendance reached 167 boys and 25 girls, with 90 in transition, 40 in first grade, 32 in second, 16 in third, 7 in fourth and 7 in fifth. Finally, in 1960 the first Vicosino student attended the first grade of secondary school at Carhuaz, initiating integrated Vicosino participation in the school system outside the community.

Among other types of instruction used to inform the Vicosinos, information movies have been shown since the beginning of the Project when the Vicosinos saw them for the first time. These movies have broadened the mental horizons of the Vicosinos, at least with the concept that all labor in the United States is mechanized.

In the more developed countries in Western Civilization as

well as in the developed Soviet nations, the school system receives the results of scientific investigations and conveys these to students, thus widening the knowledge of the people. The Project has tried to integrate a program of research into the Vicos school. In order to protect the soil and increase production in the community of wood and fruit, the Project began an experiment with various types of trees and a reforestation campaign with an initial planting of 500 pines, 200 eucalyptus and 250 peach trees. The eucalyptus have proved very successful, and the students have planted a forest of them on a site given to the school by the Project. This year the school is growing more seedlings for the pupils to plant at their homes after instruction in their care. The number of eucalyptus in Vicos increases every year with the trees planted by the Vicosinos themselves since they have seen the advantages of reforestation and the qualities of this species.

One of the implications of the freedom of choice between alternatives is that citizens possess a right to change governments and to be ruled by a government functioning by and with the consent of the governed. As long as the people of Vicos were held subject by a society hierarchically structured in terms of the fundamental assumption of inequality, they had never effectively participated in any change of Peruvian government nor in the changes of the hacienda management. With the alteration of the system integrating the Vicosinos in the national citizenry, they are now able to change the composition of their governing council in their annual elections. With increasing literacy among Vicosino adults and their acquisition of requisite personal documents, this community can expect to participate in a national election for the first time in 1962 with a respectable number of voters.

Liberty in this sense presupposes that citizens have freedom to accumulate possessions including land, housing, clothing, and cash or shares in such material objects or companies or corporations that in turn own such assets, and to remain secure in their possession. Clearly the conversion of the Vicos estate from an hacienda into a cooperate enterprise offers the people many new opportunities for saving and investment. Previously they could accumulate only animals, fine clothing, jewelry, and cash which was buried in the ground. Now the Vicosinos participate in the modern financial system of cash and credit. For four years they

have sought and obtained each year loans from the Banco de Fomento Agropecuario del Peru for their agricultural ventures supervised by SCIPA. In three years they have repaid the loans and achieved a cash profit which they have deposited in commercial banks or loaned in turn to individuals or nearby communities in order to stimulate regional development. Thus, in so brief a time, the Vicosinos have been converted from hoarders into modern cooperative producers, managing their liquid capital for the benefit of the people.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURAL AND ECONOMIC THEMES IN ANDEAN ETHNOHISTORY

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Although Andean ethnohistory has long been the source of much speculation about the region's social and economic structure, paradoxically, this very concern has made it difficult to raise some of the questions which in other areas are taken for granted. It has been particularly difficult to achieve a setting for the discussion where preoccupations derived from European economic history—whether the Inca were socialist or feudal, a welfare state or one with “patriarchal” slavery—give way to an anthropological analysis, based on what we have learned ethnographically, in the field, about non-European civilizations, with cities, state controls and public revenue systems but also with kinship institutions and ethnic values enduring and functioning at all levels of the society.¹

The search for Utopia in the Andes is in part due to the sources at hand. Misunderstanding the internal organization of the ethnic peasant community, the continued vitality of reciprocity and kinship bonds, and relying too heavily on their informants among the Inca elite, the European chroniclers consistently attributed to the Inca state what were actually age-old peasant reciprocity functions. This was strengthened early in the seventeenth century when Garcilaso de la Vega, the most widely read and translated of our sources, wrote his *Commentaries*² to impress his European readers with the excellence of the system his maternal ancestors had created and his paternal kin had destroyed.

There is no need to undertake a survey of our sources. They have frequently been classified and evaluated by others.³ If one is primarily interested in the European invasion and what in Peru is called “colonial history”, obviously one's evaluation of the

¹ The original breakthrough in this field came in the late XIX century when Heinrich Cunow (1891, 1896, 1937) thought of looking at the Inca in the light of ethnography. See also Trimborn, 1927; Rowe, 1946; Kirchhoff, 1949; Murra, 1958a.

² Garcilaso de la Vega, [1604], 1943.

³ Means, 1928; Rowe, 1946; Porras Barrenechea, 1955.

various sources will be quite different from that of a student concerned with Andean social and economic structures.

However, I would like to call attention to two kinds of sources in Andean ethnohistory which seem to me not to have received all the study they deserve:

1) Those describing a particular valley, a tribe, a town or a set of villages as opposed to those trying to "explain" what "the Incas" as a whole were like. Descriptions like those collected in the four volumes of the *Relaciones Geográficas de Indias*⁴ were made most frequently within a bureaucratic setting, being answers to questionnaires circulated by the European colonial administration. Some of the earlier ones were made soon enough after the invasion for many of the respondents to have been functioning adults under the Inca regime.

2) Those written or compiled later in the sixteenth or early in the seventeenth centuries by authors whose ancestors, or at least the maternal ones, were Andean Americans, as opposed to earlier writers who were mostly Europeans. Although differing enormously among themselves in aims, personality and sensitivity to their European readers, they frequently have in common an interest and a familiarity with local, village conditions which allows their use as supplements and checks to both the administrative records, above, and to the more familiar chroniclers.

I would like to illustrate the value of this new evidence by commenting on one document each from the two kinds of sources. The first is Iñigo Ortiz de Zúñiga's report on his inspection trip to Huánuco in 1562, just thirty years after the invasion; the other is a better known collection of folklore from Huarochirí, in the mountains above Lima, collected in the first decade of the seventeenth century by a native of Cuzco, Francisco de Avila.⁵

Although the publication in the *Revista del Archivo Nacional de Lima* of Ortiz' survey and questionnaires began as long ago as 1920, it was interrupted for thirty years and was not renewed till 1955.⁶ It is still incomplete, but enough is now available to allow

⁴Jimenez de la Espada, editor; 1881-1897. A writer like Rowe, 1946, has made most efficient use of this source.

⁵Trimbom, 1939, 1942, 1952. For additional comment on Avila see Polo, 1906; Porras Barrenechea, 1955, pp. 32-3, 54-5; Rowe, 1957, p. 185.

⁶Ortiz de Zúñiga, 1920-25, 1955 to date. An even earlier 1549, report is available for this area, see Hilmer, 1953.

us to state that after Huaman Poma's *Corónica*⁷ this is the most important single source on Inca social and economic structure published in the last forty years. Its virtue consists in recording the prudent but not unassertive statements of several score Huánuco chiefs of varying ranks, when asked by Ortiz to compare Inca conditions with those of 1562. The document also includes the first house-to-house census available to us from the Andes.

Since it will not be possible in a short space to present all the evidence dredged up by Iñigo Ortiz' questionnaire, I have selected one aspect of Inca and Andean social organization on which our information before was notoriously contradictory and incomplete: the status, functions and revenues of the *kuraka*, the traditional ethnic leadership in the Andes. After the Inca conquest these men were drawn into the administrative system of the state. What their duties, rights and privileges had been within the ethnic community remained a matter of speculation.⁸ There is no reason to assume a uniformity throughout the Andes of such duties and rights, for one expects to find cultural differences between coast and highlands, between herders' chiefs and those of irrigated oases; also because *kuraka* is a rather vague term covering offices differing enormously in power and responsibilities, from men in charge of small valleys with a few settlements to the king of Chimú.

Our traditional sources have also been weak on the details of arrangements prevailing once the *kuraka* were incorporated in the Inca administrative, political and revenue-producing machinery. We knew that upon incorporation the *kuraka* lost some of their old privileges such as that of initiating warfare; we also knew that they were confirmed in their jobs by the conquerors if there was no reason to doubt their allegiance and that the lineage could expect to retain access to the position even though an individual did not manage to obtain Inca confirmation of the appointment.

The document under consideration is a lucky find in view of our

⁷ Poma, [1615], 1936.

⁸ See Rowe, 1946, p. 261; Kirchhoff, 1949, where distinction is drawn between "commoners" and "nobles" but where *kuraka* are neglected; Murra, 1956, Chapter II, Land Tenure; Chapter V, Peasant Corvée and the Revenues of the State; Chapter VI, Allocation of Surplus or the Redistributive State.

effort to understand these traditional ethnic leaders since the men interviewed were mostly local people, tied to the population of a relatively small area by an endless web of kinship, ethnic loyalties and obligations. They were of various ages and dispositions and the older make reference to personal experiences and travel to Cuzco in Inca times; several were obviously still enjoying many of the perquisites of their traditional rank.⁹

The Huánuco area was occupied in Inca times by four *waranqa*, four census units of about a thousand households each.¹⁰ Within this arithmetic uniformity, familiar to us from the chroniclers but still a matter of conjecture when it comes to understanding the functions and nature of the decimal divisions,¹¹ the *visita* of 1562 reveals a variety of populations. Many were local people—Chupachos or Yachas, which may well be ethnic names, since they do not refer to a particular settlement but to groups of villages and hamlets, with their dependent colonies in the warm *kuka*-growing country and pastures on the cold *puna*. But the *waranqa* included also *mitmaq* settlers transplanted by the crown for strategic and maize-growing purposes. Other groups took care of state herds grazing in the neighborhood. While the *waranqa* chiefs were all local people, we discover that their functional jurisdiction did not really extend over the newcomers although the latter were enumerated with the indigenous population for census purposes: "the said mitimaes have their own chief, from Cuzco, and never did the main chief of this division have any lordship or power over them, on the contrary the mitimaes had power over these since they were placed there as overseers of the Inca".¹²

The Huánuco questionnaire confirms the point that the ethnic leadership came to office along kinship lines: Joan Chuchuyaure, principal *kuraka* of Yachas succeeded his relatives on the job and it (the succession) "comes from very far back".¹³ There is no evidence here of the point made a decade later by Sarmiento de Gamboa and Francisco de Toledo that the Inca appointed out-

⁹ Rowe, 1954, 1957.

¹⁰ Rowe, 1946, pp. 263-4; 1958.

¹¹ Murra, 1958a, pp. 33-34.

¹² Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1920, I, p. 162.

¹³ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1956, XX, pp. 302, 311.

siders to *kuraka* jobs; only *mitmaq* settlements had non-local leadership.

One aspect of *kuraka* succession which receives its clearest statement in this document is the absence of primogeniture or any other method for the automatic devolution of the job—"the man who was the man for it" being picked among the lineage members. In discussing the top job soon to become vacant, Nina Pucar remarked to the interviewer that the lineage heir would be selected "if he were a man (fit) to rule and, if not, they will make another chief because in each *waranka* there are chiefs' sons who could do it. . . ."¹⁴

Given the date when this information was recorded, the Huánuco material is no better than our standard sources on pre-Incaic functions of ethnic leaders—the bulk of the data deals with obligations to the state. However at least one informant mentions the distribution of "new" lands as well as those left ownerless, a *kuraka* duty till today.¹⁵ Welfare functions which the European and European-influenced chroniclers attribute to the king are here located where we think they belong—in the hands of the leaders of the kin group. *Kuraka* also saw to it that the lands of an old woman, alone and too old to work, were planted for her;¹⁶ at times they also distributed llamas,¹⁷ which were scarce but highly valued in Huánuco.

Chiefs were in turns the beneficiaries of traditional reciprocity: they had access to a variety of services from all households, including those of craftsmen.¹⁸ We are told that the community gathered and the work was divided among the households who provided farming, weaving, herding, house building and hauling services. The enumeration of these duties is not very different from the available sources. Its importance consists in confirming what some students have long suspected: the model for

¹⁴ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1920, I, pp. 184-5. We are obviously dealing here with administrative and political choice and not ethnic or kinship leadership, since the four *waranka* were a territorial division including local groups of very distinct antecedents. This is the first time that a *kuraka* administering a quartet of *waranka* has been reported in our sources.

¹⁵ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1920, pp. 25, 45-6. For contemporary ethnography see Nuñez del Prado, 1949 and unpublished reports from elsewhere in Cuzco and Puno.

¹⁶ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1957, XXI, p. 327.

¹⁷ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1921, II, pp. 223, 227.

¹⁸ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1957, XXI, pp. 69-70.

the revenues of the state are the revenues of the *kuraka*; there are no contributions in kind, only in time or labor; like the *kuraka* the king will try to live up to the reciprocity expectations of the citizenry—all hands working for somebody else, including higher authority, must be wined and dined while on *corvée*; the wool for the cloth to be woven was supplied by the beneficiary.¹⁹

The most novel feature of *kuraka* privilege that emerges from Iñigo Ortiz' report is the presence in the community of chiefly retainers whose economic and social status differed from those of other villagers. The above mentioned Chuchuyaure, of Yachas (350 households in Inca times), declared that he had four men "de servicio", two young and two married. The bachelors were away (one with the llamas, the other in warm country) and are not enumerated; the married men turn up some pages later, in the house-to-house census. They are the only men in the community beyond the chief who are exempted from paying tribute to their European *encomendero*, since they are part of the personal, full-time staff of Chuchuyaure; even after thirty years of European control²⁰ the *kuraka* is free of *corvée* duties, just as he was in Inca times, and able to protect his privileges and those of his domestic staff. One of these retainers, Liquira, in house no. 73, had not even bothered to be baptized; he had no lands of his own, but worked those of his master, and was able to feed two wives and four children with an unspecified share of the crop. To get the clothing needed for his family he bartered agricultural produce.²¹ He and his partner living in house no. 81, mention as their other duties weaving for Chuchuyaure's household and trading on his behalf at Chinchacocha. There is no indication where Liquira is from or how he got into his present circumstances. When questioned, he said he served of his own free will, but the question was a leading one and Liquira had been an adult at the time of the European invasion. There is no indication that these men suffered any disabilities. Furthermore their polygynous households, as well as the responsibilities entrusted to them, do not seem to imply that we are dealing here with a servile,

¹⁹Murra, 1956, Chapter V, "Peasant *Corvée* and the Revenues of the State".

²⁰Rowe, 1957.

²¹Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1957, XXI, pp. 318, 326.

low-status group. The only hint of dissatisfaction emerges when Liquira indicated that although landless he *had* time to cultivate.²²

The question which arises here, is: what relation is there between such full-time "servants" as Liquira and the *yana* retainers of the king?²³ Are we again confronted with a pre-Incaic pattern on which the later, state institution is modeled? The data are inconclusive, but the hint is worth remembering.

In addition to the four men, Joan Chuchuyaure had four women sharing his own house, no. 84: a senior wife with five children and three younger women "de servicio", with six more offspring by don Joan between them. They spun the wool and cotton to be woven by the male retainers.²⁴ Four women were about par for a *kuraka* in Huánuco. I have not yet had the time to study the composition of the many households enumerated by Ortiz, but my impression is that polygyny was not frequent and four women were clearly a sign of considerable status.

On another front *kuraka* intervened as judges and arbitrators in a variety of situations: land disputes, theft, violence, adultery. The information is unfortunately imbedded in a description of justice and administration in Inca times and emphasizes the fact that "federal", Cuzco officials frequently intervened in local judicial matters, confirming decisions and apparently acting "on appeal", ordering people to be lectured in public, whipped and even killed. It is hard to tell from the evidence how the jurisdiction was split; chances are that short of rebellion or refusal to work off one's *corvée* obligations, *kuraka* carried on as of old between the periodic visits of the Cuzco inspectors.

In general, the Huánuco material is most revealing in the area of *kuraka*-Inca relations. The ethnic leadership may have been selected along kinship lines and confirmed by their peers, but "they did not dare to sit on the *tiana*" of rank until they received

²² *ibid.*, p. 318.

²³ Trimbom, 1927; Kirchhoff, 1949, pp. 299-300; Nuñez Anavitarte, 1955; Murra, 1956, Ch. VIII, "From *Corvée* to Retainership".

²⁴ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1957, XXI, p. 327.

²⁵ Since the answers of the *kuraka* are available to us only through the filter of the interpreter and the recording clerk, we cannot here corroborate the suggestive distinction drawn by Rowe between "provincial governors" or *t'ogrikoq* and inspectors or *tukuy-rikoq*. See Rowe, 1946, p. 264 and Rowe, 1958, pp. 500-1.

the sanction of "the Inca."²⁵ "Ability" or "skill in ruling" were now evaluated by the state as well as the community and we are told that leaders of all ranks required such sanction. Since such omniscience by the center is difficult to visualize, given the size and newness of the Inca state, one is pleased to hear from one of the informants that it was the local Inca "governor"—the inspector and representative of central authority—who did the actual confirming,²⁶ a degree of decentralization which is not astonishing but which had not been documented previously. In the same context, we hear that sons of the *kuraka* in office spent one or two years at the "governor's mansion", matching the Cuzco indoctrination reported elsewhere.

While state confirmation was required to hold the job, and the inspector's visits are reported to have been frequent, our informants try to give the impression that they were removed from office only rarely. One of them says that it happened only "for very great offenses",²⁷ while another, Pulca of Auquimarca, insists that only if a person were guilty of one or more of "five very principal lapses" did he lose his job. These five are listed as: disregarding orders from the Inca governor, attempted rebellion, neglect in collection or forwarding of crops raised on state lands, carelessness in organizing the sacrifices required three times a year, and to have used the peasants at weaving or other tasks beyond the customary labor services.²⁸ Although Pulca is our only source for such a list, it is a suggestive one; we are beginning to get away from the idealized version of Inca social organization.

The details presented are sufficient, I think, to indicate that we are dealing here not only with new information but with a hitherto unused kind of source, one which illuminates the functioning of Inca society at the local level. Since there is every reason to be-

²⁵ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1920, I, pp. 38, 158 and 1955, XIX, p. 197.

²⁶ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1955, XIX, p. 207.

²⁷ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1956, XX, p. 301.

²⁸ Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], 1920, I, p. 157. The first three are expectable from other sources; the fourth is new and further details should shed much light on the relations of the state church to the conquered ethnic groups; the fifth is, in a way the most provocative: it indicates possible intervention of the crown into traditional *corvée* arrangements by acting as "protector" of the peasantry. It does confirm a claim of Garcilaso's which I must confess I always considered part of his apologetics. See Garcilaso, [1604], Bk V, ch. ii; 1943, p. 227.

lieve that additional questionnaires of this kind²⁹ for the period before the 1572 reorganization can be located, our hopes of someday reconstructing the local peasant version of Inca social structure are high.

My comments upon my second source need not be as elaborate since it is familiar to the anthropological world through the efforts of Prof. H. Trimborn, who has published the Quechua text collected by Avila, its German translation and several commentaries.³⁰ As a source on economic and social structure it is very different from the Huánuco report, since it is a collection of folklore. However, the two sources have one thing in common: they deal with life in a limited area and do not attempt any generalizations about the Andes as a whole. Thus, both provide a localized check on the broad canvass; both also give us unique material, unavailable in the chronicles.

One of the most controversial and poorest documented of Andean institutions is the *ayllu*, the kinship unit in the local social organization.³¹ The chief deficiency in our study is the absence of materials on the functioning of the *ayllu* in particular circumstances. In the Huarochiri material, the *ayllu* is taken for granted; it is, alas, insufficiently described, but it does appear in a wide variety of cultural contexts: ceremonial, economic, historical.

Tradition records which *ayllu* broke off from which;³² some kind of seniority was observed between maximal and minimal lineages: "the Tutayquiris. . . were the last born of the Quinti and the Chica treated them with contempt since they were the youngest".³³ Since many modern commentators see in the Inca *ayllu* primarily the localized, territorial community, it is interesting to

²⁹ We are aware of at least one other document submitted to the *oidores* of Lima in response to this questionnaire, that of Polo de Ondegardo, published by C. A. Romero, 1940. We do not know how many *visitadores* like Iñigo Ortiz were sent out; since the questionnaire came from the king, in Europe, and was meant to apply to the whole *audiencia* of Lima, there is no reason to suppose that the Huánuco *visita* was unique. Santillán was one of the *oidores* at the time. See Santillán, [1663-64], 1927.

³⁰ Trimborn, 1939, 1942, 1952. The folio references below are to the photostatic copy of Avila's manuscript published by Galante, 1942.

³¹ Rowe, 1946, pp. 253-56; Kirchhoff, 1949, pp. 294-99. A Peruvian historian Mrs. Maria R. de Diez Canseco is now engaged in an archival study of royal *ayllu* or *panaka*. Information on such status lineages is more readily available than on peasant *ayllu*, and should be very useful.

³² Avila, [1608], ch. VII, folio 71v; ch. XI, folio 77v.

³³ Avila, [1608], ch. XI, folio 77v; ch. XXXI, f. 105v.

note that Sutca *ayllu* was reported to have died out at San Damian but was still surviving at Sacsacancha and Tumna.³⁴ Various community-wide tasks such as cultivating shrine lands, or providing sacrificial llamas, were undertaken "ayllu by ayllu", on rotation.³⁵ Avila notes that each *ayllu* and town was likely to have its own version of the folkloric material recorded.³⁶

Marriage is another institution on which functional information is very rare. While Inigo Ortiz' material does give support to the reports that the state intervened in marital matters,³⁷ in Huarochiri folklore there is no mention of such intervention. Marriage is here seen in the context of village and kin group initiative. A *qhapaq hatun apu*, a powerful *kuraka*, can treat his daughter as disposable and promised her in exchange for being cured of a chronic illness.³⁸ In case of conflict over irrigation waters between two *ayllu*, marriage is a way of reconciling the conflicting claims.³⁹ One should consult the woman's father before carrying her off, even with her consent. Her kin were indignant, and even promises of houses, fields and llamas did not seem to mollify them. Eventually, the groom, who turns out to be a local deity, provided them with a subterranean canal for the irrigation of their crops.⁴⁰ This also confirms the probability of bride wealth hinted at in other materials.⁴¹ Marriage with male outsiders did take place, but their foreign origin was remembered.⁴²

Economic matters are also illuminated in this source. Access to land is established by kinship claims, and conquest is accompanied by efforts to wipe out the potential claimants.⁴³ Agriculture is the object of considerable ritual observance, with major magical effort being exerted over irrigation and the llama herds.⁴⁴ In addi-

³⁴Avila, [1608], ch. XXVI, f. 96v. Since these texts were recorded seventy years after the invasion and thirty after Toledo's resettlement, it is possible that such dispersion of *ayllu* members is a post-European phenomenon.

³⁵Avila, [1608], ch. XIX, f. 84v; ch. XX ff. 84v-85r; ch. XXIV, f. 92v.

³⁶Avila, [1608], ch. XIII, f. 79r.

³⁷Ortiz de Zúñiga, [1562], See also Murra, 1958a, p. 33.

³⁸Avila, [1608], ch. v, f. 68r.

³⁹Avila, [1608], ch. XXX, ff. 99v-100r.

⁴⁰Avila, [1608], ch. XXXI, 103r.

⁴¹Murra, [1956], ch. I.

⁴²Avila, [1608], ch. XXIV, f. 92r.

⁴³Avila, [1608], ch. XXXI, ff. 101v-102r.

⁴⁴Avila, [1606], ch. VII, f. 71v; ch. XXIV, ff. 94r-v.

tion to peasant holdings, we find, in Huarochirí, land apportioned to local shrines;⁴⁵ Pachacamac, the well known coastal deity, had pastures reserved for him, and herds "in every town".⁴⁶ Inca economic exactions are mentioned only casually but even here the information provides dimensions absent elsewhere. The Inca confirmed tenure in llamas and pastures claimed by local shrines;⁴⁷ locally-grown state crops were used for offerings to these deities in addition to the libations and sacrifices of the community; so was state cloth woven by the local women.⁴⁸

The Inca also intervened by assigning "servants" described as *yana* to the several local shrines. Pariacaca was granted fifty "servants" for helping the Inca king against his enemies.⁴⁹ Elsewhere in the text we hear of thirty men from Yauyos who also worked for Pariacaca's shrine.⁵⁰ Pachacamac had "many hundreds" of such retainers;⁵¹ various religious specialists and *waka* caretakers are mentioned in an *ayllu* context, but it is impossible to say if full-time retainers are pre-Incaic or not.

Status differences are pronounced. The powerful (*qhapaq*) are people who can claim the assistance of many women and men for such various tasks as house building, dancing or hauling grass on llama-back.⁵² The weak (*waqcha*) are potato eaters⁵³ and can be readily recognized by their torn and grimy clothing. To discover that the father of one's child was *waqcha* was enough to drive a female deity to suicide.⁵⁴

The points listed above should be enough to indicate the wealth of social and economic data to be found in such early folkloric material, collected in Quechua by the Andean writers of the turn of the seventeenth century. Even where their ostensible purpose was the destruction of Andean culture and religion, their intimate knowledge of the language and their roots in the culture they were destroying make them a very important source.

⁴⁵ Avila, [1608], ch. XIX, f. 84v, but see ch. XXIV, f. 105v. where the Concha, who were considered Pariacaca Tutayquiri's "youngest sons", were sparing with assigning lands to his shrine. See translation in Trimborn, 1942, p. 149.

⁴⁶ Avila, [1608], ch. XX, f. 85v; ch. XXII, f. 89r.

⁴⁷ Avila, [1608], ch. XX, f. 85v.

⁴⁸ Avila, [1608], ch. XVIII, f. 83r.

⁴⁹ Avila, [1608], ch. XVIII, f. 83v.

⁵⁰ Avila, [1608], ch. XXII, f. 89r.

⁵¹ Avila, [1608], ch. XXII, f. 91v.

⁵² Avila, [1608], ch. V, ff. 68v-69v.

⁵³ Avila, [1608], ch. V, f. 67r. For status differences among crops and foods, see Murra, 1960.

⁵⁴ Avila, [1608], ch. II, ff. 64v-67r.

I am optimistic about our chances in years to come to extend our knowledge of the economic and social structure of the Inca state. We may not find any new Ciezas or Cobos; but I know that many more such local surveys as Iñigo Ortiz de Zuñiga's have been neglected and we have just begun to study the Quechua text of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. I submit that we will find these sources to be even more revealing than the traditional ethnohistoric sources on the Andes.

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ITALIAN COLONIZATION IN SOUTHERN BRAZIL*

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The immigration of some 200 thousand European farmers and artisans (Germans, Poles, Russians, Frenchmen, Swiss, Italians and others) between 1824 and 1910 was one of the most relevant factors in the formation of the present society and culture of the State of Rio Grande do Sul. This area, because of its participation in national industrial production, has been considered by some authors as part of industrialized Brazil, but for others it constitutes a peculiar economic area because of the combination of agriculture, cattle-raising, and industry in its economy (Azevedo 1959: 1-170).

An early effect of the impact of immigration, apparent in demographic censuses, was the rapid increase of population in the area. Few units of the Brazilian federation recorded an increase comparable to that of Rio Grande do Sul in the last hundred years; it is enough to say that while the population of Brazil as a whole increased fivefold between 1872, when the first national census took place, and 1950, the number of inhabitants in that State increased tenfold. This constituted a higher relative increment than those registered for the Federal District and Paraná, and is only exceeded by that of São Paulo. In fact, during that period the population of the country increased from 9,930,478 to 57,944,397 people, but in Rio Grande do Sul, partly because of the increase in nationals but mainly as a result of foreign immigration, it jumped from 434,813 to 4,164,821 inhabitants in spite of the cessation of mass immigration before World War I and its demographic losses in the last decades. National immigration, which will not be analyzed here, was instrumental in a cultural leveling of the area to national values, *mores* and major institutions; this role by itself deserves much more attention than it has received up to now.

Another effect of foreign immigration was the diversification of economic production and change in the system of land use. The

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establishment of great numbers of European agriculturists in small holdings for the production of subsistence and cash crops contrasts with the large cattle *estâncias* and *fazendas* which, together with wheat, corn, rice, and manioc farms, characterized the rest of the province until 1824.

Until then the population of Rio Grande do Sul was very dispersed, and a considerable part of its territory was practically uninhabited and very little exploited. Two or three ecological areas with differing ethnic and historical backgrounds had been formed by then. On the coast and in the center of the province, groups of early Portuguese and Brazilian settlers from São Paulo, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, and also Azorean colonists who came in the first half of the eighteenth century, either bred cattle or produced subsistence crops; from the beginning of the seventeenth century many *vacarias* had been established in the *campos* of a portion of the North by colonists from Laguna in the neighboring province of S. Catarina. In a curved belt along the boundary separating Brazil from Uruguay and Argentina, which only after 1750 the Portuguese came to occupy permanently, the large cattle *estâncias* were populated by early Portuguese and Brazilian settlers who had mixed with the Indians left in the area after the *misiones* of Paraguayan Jesuits had been wiped out by bands of *bandeirantes*, from São Paulo (Azevedo 1959-2:21).

The German immigrants, who began to arrive in 1824, settled on the slopes of the mountain range situated in the northeast of the province and organized a society, isolated for many decades, whose economic base was the family plot of land on which hogs were raised, and corn, beans, and other vegetables were planted for local consumption and for export to other areas. In that same area there were soon formed towns where the work of artisans and former factory workers from Germany gave rise to the first industries of Rio Grande do Sul. The subculture of this area, where dialects and some institutions of German origin prevailed, has been described in an abundant literature, but only since the thirties of this century has it been studied from sociological and anthropological points of view by Truda, Maack, and especially by Willems (Willems 1940: *passim*, and in other books and articles).

In 1875, Italian immigrants from the northern regions of Italy,

such as Lombardy, Piedmont, Venezia, and Tyrol began to establish themselves on the plateaus and in the mountains beyond the area occupied by the German colonists. Between that date and 1914 about 74,000 Italians entered the state and settled in a compact zone in *colonias* in which very small numbers of Brazilian farmers, perhaps no more than two or three percent, were found.

The settlers had to fell century-old pine trees and open their way through the forest to build their first homes. The pattern of land occupation started from a system of plots sold by the Government to the colonists with areas ranging from 15 to 60 hectares, of an elongated rectangular shape with a front side 200 to 250 metres in length opening on a crude road called "linha" (line) or "travessão." The settlers worked under the supervision of Brazilian bureaucrats and technicians, and were in contact with Brazilian peasants who traversed the area with mule trains loaded with merchandise en route from the capital of the province to the northern cattle belt. At present most of the plots are between 10 and 25 hectares in size having been split up for sale or by reason of inheritance.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider and to analyze the various implications of the resulting demographic and ethnic structure of the current society of Rio Grande do Sul and the complex process of acculturation and assimilation of these masses of immigrants, or the correlation of the culture or cultures prevailing in the area with the patterns found in the country as a whole. These problems have been dealt with elsewhere (Azevedo 1959-2: *passim*). This paper will provide, therefore, only a brief but thorough tentative description of the types of peasantry produced in the area by the settlement of Italian immigrants in sporadic and selective contact with the national society and culture. Our aim is to contribute some material to explain the establishment of types of peasantry in Brazil following a scheme delineated by Wagley and Harris (1955: *passim*).

The current peasant society of the area, which includes some towns that are important as industrial and trade centers, resulted from the reelaboration of a European experience in the process of adapting families and individuals—carriers of regional varieties of the Italian culture of the second half of the nineteenth century—to a new environment which put them in contact with another

national society. The area of those "colonias" is estimated at 173,000 sq. km.; it had, in 1950, a population density of 46 per sq. km., of which 65% were rural. In that same year 90% of the existing rural plots belonged to people who had family names that were "distinctly Italian" (Rothwell 1951:26). In some places, namely around the villages and the largest urban nuclei, minifundia have been recorded; agglutination of plots to form large farms is to be found in very few cases. The current agricultural techniques, the size and structure of the family and the exemption from any taxes on farms smaller than 25 hectares discourage agglutination and even promote the gradual subdivision of old *fazendas* of the neighboring *campos*, or open grassy fields.

Since the beginning of the 'colonization', the use of land consisted of cultivation for the simultaneous production of subsistence and cash crops. Very soon there was established a pattern of rotation of land and of crops, according to which wheat succeeded corn and beans in the same section, and parts of the plot were put to fallow for periods of indefinite duration. Other sections were permanently occupied by a vineyard and a grazing area for the mules employed in transportation and the cows kept for dairy purposes.

Ecological balance in the region thus resulted from the interplay of various factors viz: a) land rotation combined with crop rotation, b) a constant outflow of surplus population, c) patterns of marriage and inheritance. The population of the region is stabilized through these mechanisms; the average number of residents per unit in 691 *colonias* registered in 1955 in the *município* of Caxias do Sul was from 5 to 7 people and consisted of conjugal families which in about 40% of the cases included the parents or, less often, the fathers-in-law of the head of the family. The regimen of inheritance and succession of property established through custom operates in such a way that the male sons, as soon as they reach marrying age, receive from their parents a plot of land in another area or, more rarely, a fraction of the father's plot. The girls are allotted a dowry in the form of household appliances, and other items for their trousseau, but no land, since they are supposed to be co-proprietors of the land owned by their would-be husbands. By means of juridical artifice, which runs against the provisions of the Civil Code providing equal participation of sons

in the parents' estate, the land plot is eventually awarded to the younger or one of the youngest sons. This pattern of ultimogeniture and dowries operates to guarantee the perpetuation of the family in the same plot through its youngest generations.

These small and middle-sized farms are operated directly by the owners and resident families, which for some purposes make use of help from their neighbors. Salaried workers as well as renters and sharecroppers are to be found in very small numbers. Out of a total of 6,404 farms recorded in three "municípios" of the region, in 1952, less than 6% were not operated by their owners. Grapes, wheat, and corn are sold and processed for the production of wine and flour, of which a part is consumed at home through the agency of co-operatives. Surpluses of vegetables, fruits, eggs, dairy and poultry products are sold in villages and towns. This combination of closed to open cash economies is complementary to the urban economy in the same region.

In the opinion of the agronomists and economists of the area, the agricultural methods of the farmers are now looked upon as backward and resistant to improvement. The prevailing tool is the hoe, but ploughs pulled by oxen were recorded on 50 to 60% of the farms, together with insecticide-dusters, mechanical grape presses, carts, some mules and cows. Tractors and silos are very scarce. Jeeps, trucks, and windmills for the production of electricity can be found in limited numbers. The use of chemical fertilizers is still small, but cows and oxen, besides their utilization for transportation, are valued for their manure. Hay is preserved in stacks for the animals during the winter, as in Europe. However, the yield of these farms is ordinarily high above the national averages for wheat, grapes, and other products. They contribute almost 80% of the national production of wines.

In the region each group of 50 to 60 families forms a community whose center is a "capela," a name derived from a social and political organization, the "Sociedade da Capela," consisting of the religious organizations, the school, the recreation center, economic organizations such as the "Cantina" which manufactures wine, the mills that produce corn meal and wheat flour, and, very rarely, a store. The word "capela" derives from the church or chapel around which the whole associational life flourishes, and which is built side by side with the school, the cemetery, and the

"copa" (an Italian name for the amusement hall annexed to the church). These buildings, as a rule, do not follow any urban pattern.

More than 62% of the population five years of age and above is literate, and a large number of public primary schools function in the area.

The descendant of Italian immigrants, either in town or in the rural area, thinks of himself as identified with a subculture derived from the experiences of the latter, and from this point of view he calls himself "Italian." Being in an advanced state of acculturation but not yet completely assimilated to the national culture and society, the peasant cherishes values and *mores* which are assumed to stem from his cultural inheritance, like a) industriousness, b) thrift, c) foresight, and d) religiosity. Hardworking people, persistent in their endeavors, are equated with the "Italians." Individualism and competition for profit are to some extent institutionalized as motivations for toil, foresight and saving.

Religion has, in a peasant society, a relevant function not only as a means of communication and control of the supernatural but as an instrument for prestige and social control. It is in order to say that practically all the "colonos" are Catholics of the type ordinarily called *practising* in Brazil, or formal (Spitzer 1958:3), and religion is definitely prescriptive (Bellah 1958:1). Through the "Sociedade da Capela," constituted by the family heads and devotional associations, the parish priest stands at the apex of the system of status and of formal social control. Those organizations add to their religious purposes the functions of organs for communal solidarity and mutual help in distress, and exercise a marked role in the control of religious and lay celebrations. In spite of his high prestige and status, the priest is very close to the peasants. He visits them in their homes, talks to them in their Venetian dialect, drinks and plays cards with the men in the "copa." His moral and religious authority has no competition, and he acts as a counselor for individuals and for the community as a whole in matters economic, administrative, and political. Participation in posts of the religious structure is, therefore, the main expression of prestige for the peasants.

The agricultural produce is partly controlled through supernatural means such as an annual blessing of forage for the animals

employed on the farms and the solemn blessing of the crops by the priest followed processionally by the farmers. Homes and families are likewise blessed. These rites are supposed to be of high spiritual significance but are also economically relevant, since the yield of the crops depends much on them.

The present adult rural population, when at home, at work, or in its contacts with those who have migrated to town, speaks the Venetian dialect, which, modified as it was by other north Italian dialects and by Portuguese, came to be a lingua franca in the region. The peasant, however, is bilingual and tends to substitute the national vernacular for his former language. The young people and the children can understand the speech of the elders but no longer use it themselves; at school and in church they hear and speak only Portuguese.

In this "colonial" area there are farmers who own properties of different values and whose income differs, too. In spite of this diversification one cannot talk of true social classes in that society. Given the ethnic homogeneity of the population, there is no stratification following lines separating distinct physical types. Since property and exploitation of land are not separate functions and there are neither great "fazendeiros" nor subordinate, dependant land tenants and sharecroppers, the "colonos" are structured in a rural middle class which combines the roles of proprietor, manager, and worker, contrasting with most of the peasants of the rest of the country (Oberg 1957:131) and with those described for Latin America as a whole. (Wagley & Harris 1955: *passim*; Wolf 1955: *passim*).

Some peculiar institutions and mechanisms operate to strengthen and protect the social structure and the culture of the region. One of them is the ethnic endogamy, which results in absolute predominance of marriages between descendants of the immigrants. From 1912 through 1954 the inter-ethnic marriage amounted only to 5% in a rural parish of the area; the phenomenon can be explained, in part, by the ethnic composition of the rural population, which contains only minimal numbers of "lusos," or of Brazilians of Portuguese descent. Another factor is the family exogamy which in some places comes to be a community exogamy, consisting of marriages of residents of diverse, although neighboring communities. In the same parish already

mentioned, more than 33% out of the 116 marriages celebrated in 1949 involved couples from different "capelas." These patterns are supported by strong incest taboos derived from canonical legislation and from belief in the sterility of unions between close relatives. Neo-local residence patterns and ultimogeniture (*Jungerrecht* in German law tradition) combine with the rules of marriage to enforce economic and social usages.

The Italian immigrant who becomes a "colono" is specifically a peasant because of the nature of his economic activities and his ties with the land in the rural area. However, he can be distinguished from the other peasant, commonly called "caboclo" in other regions of Brazil as well as from the "fazendeiro," and "sitiantes" of the areas surrounding the Brazilian cities. Some of these distinctions call for clarification.

In his relationship to the large regional and national societies the "colono" does not depend on the mediation of a paternalistic, higher rural class of "fazendeiros" or "patrões" (bosses) and "protectors." The *compadresco* system, too, does not have the function which it fulfills in other sectors of Brazilian society as an asymmetrical relation for the benefit of the lowest classes. The same must be said of the politician who helps and protects the voter, since the former does not exist in the region. There the peasantry relates directly with the impersonal urban order, where it becomes the working class. A religious life of a formal type, the interest in education and in the school, the widespread exercise of voting, the obligation of formal marriage (civil and religious), of baptism, and civil registration show that for the "colono" such institutions are not mere symbols of a social strata and of a culture alien to themselves; they are really instrumental in their own society.

The population of this area simultaneously participates in a process of acculturation to national patterns and standards and in the formation of a pluralistic society such as Brazilian society.

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THE CANELA SINCE NIMUENDAJU:
A Preliminary Report on Cultural Change*

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Between 1929 and 1936, the German-born Brazilian anthropologist Curt Nimuendaju spent fourteen months with the Canela Indians, otherwise known as the Rămčkòkamekra, a Jê-speaking people on the northeastern edge of the Brazilian central plateau. A result of his studies made during six visits is the posthumously published monograph *The Eastern Timbira* (1946), translated from the German and edited by the late Robert Lowie. One object of my field research among these same people has been to compare the Canela Rămčkòkamekra society of today with the Nimuendaju study completed twenty-five years ago in an attempt to trace the changes that have occurred in most areas of culture, using the monograph as a base line.

After twenty-four months of field work ending in September 1960, living as a member of a Canela family in a Canela house and learning a good deal of the language, my observations are that, with only a few important exceptions, most changes are quantitative rather than qualitative. Nevertheless, these changes have such far-reaching ramifications that the Canelas are exhibiting a considerable amount of dysfunctional behavior. On the other hand, the degree of cultural continuity and stability is high. For example, though the Canela age-grade system still exists so that its units can be seen isolated from the rest of the society and observed in action from time to time, these groups have ceased to perform most of their traditional economic and socializing functions effectively. They are no longer called almost daily into companies to carry out public work duties such as service on the farm plots or on the race tracks, nor is the group training in the initiation festivals taken very seriously by the youths. The result is that much of the necessary farm

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work is not done, and that the youths of today are often flouting the laws of their ancestors. Consequently, where there had been horticultural self-sufficiency and a military-like respect for the commands of the age-grade leaders, the Canelas now have to go on begging trips in the local Brazilian communities, where they also seek small jobs, to stave off hunger for almost half of the year. Where there had been a relatively high degree of order, stealing, drunkenness, and divorce have become commonplace.

The main purpose here is to give a description of some aspects of the contemporary Canela society as a report to those who are interested in the Nimuendaju monograph. Besides this, two trends will be traced in order to demonstrate the extensive effects that dysfunction in the authoritative lines of communication has had upon the society. Then a brief analysis of the acculturative history will be presented to aid in the comprehension of the present day conditions.

THE CULTURAL SETTING

As a Jê-speaking people, the Canelas are related to the Timbira, Krahô, Apinayé, Šavánte, Kayapó, and others. They live by hunting, fishing, gathering, and a simple horticulture of the slash-and-burn type. They are classified as marginal by Julian Steward (1946). According to historical documents (Nimuendaju 1946: 32), they sought the protection of governmental military contingents after a serious defeat by another tribe of Jê-speaking Indians, the Čákamekra, in 1814. They were subsequently pacified and fought only one more war when called upon by the government in the middle of the last century to help in subduing the neighboring Gamela, a Tupi-speaking tribe. During the last fifty years they have been in constant contact with the local Brazilian settlers of the interior, called the *sertanejo*. A post of the Brazilian Indian Protection Service was established close to the village in 1941, and its personnel have successfully protected the Canela lands against the periodic encroachments of the *sertanejos* (a service of inestimable importance, since many responsible people in the area believe that these Indians would have been at least dispersed by now were it not for their support by the government). In keeping with

the national policy, the Service agents have, in a general manner, encouraged the maintenance of aboriginal practices. Merchants and travelers, mounted or on foot, pass through the community daily. They buy local products at low prices and sell their own goods at great profit thus generating ill will among the Canelas who are usually willing to compromise in order to please the other person. Based partly on these ungenerous attitudes and on practices that the Canelas see as "hoarding," which to the *sertanejos* are viewed as planning for the future, the Canelas have built up a very negative stereotype of the *sertanejos* as being categorically "bad." Until quite recently, this concept served as an ideological bulwark in defending and maintaining their belief that their indigenous way of life was better.

Since their high, savannah country is mostly sandy, the Canelas are obliged to practice their planting only along the edges of streams where there is dense wooded growth and better soil. The location of their village was shifted every five to ten years to keep it from being too distant from the family farm plots which have to be moved every year. Originally, sweet potatoes, yams, peanuts, corn, a type of sweet manioc, and other crops were grown. By the time of Curt Nimuendaju, these Indians had already become rice and bitter manioc cultivators like the *sertanejos* surrounding them, though some families have continued to raise small quantities of their traditional foods up to the present day.

It is important to recognize that the Canela population has increased by almost one fourth since the time of Nimuendaju (from three hundred and twenty to nearly four hundred). This serves to aggravate the already very serious problem created by a decrease in the food supply. The once-plentiful stock of game has been depleted by the *sertanejos* and the Canelas alike through the use of the shotgun. Attempts to raise cattle have been unsuccessful so far because of the pressure of hunger and their characteristic orientation to the present—one steak now is worth more than ten tomorrow. On the horticultural side, there appears to be an inadequate area of readily accessible gallery forest in the tribal territory to support the slash-and-burn system of land preparation. The inefficient use of the available land together with soil depletion has resulted in the

production of crops that have been insufficient to support the community. This consistent lack of basic foods from year to year has been a factor in the development of the begging trip pattern that has become so prevalent, as well as in increasing the general dependency upon the *sertanejos* and the Service.

Just as described in the monograph, the Canelas still live in a circular village with a plaza in the center, race with logs, and wear ear plugs. They are still matrilineal and matrilocal with the entire extended family often living in one house of palm thatch. They participate actively in the same festivals which are very little changed. The tribe is governed by one or more prominent chiefs who are aided in their policy making by a group of councilors. The members of this ruling and judicial body have achieved this social distinction because their age-grade has graduated into the top position. This age grouping was formed by young men during the ten year period of their initiation.

The *meipimrāk* moiety system of the winter season (Nimuen-daju, p. 168), in which a team associated with red items raced against a team related to black ones, was abandoned around 1945 though occasionally some of its practices are kept up. The summer age-grade moieties now race with logs during the winter season, though a number of time in isolated instances—most probably for the sake of variety—they do race according to the winter tradition. No adequate explanation was given for the abandonment of these traditional seasonal practices, and no one person could remember the complete cyclical schedule of usages. Moiety exogamy is not practised.

The youths are neglecting their puberty food restrictions so that in their way of thinking, they can no longer develop into good hunters, runners, and curers. During the three or four years after puberty, they are supposed to eat just the meat of the large game animals or those that bear up under the full heat of the mid-day sun, like some armadillos, so that they will grow large and resistant like these animals. For similar reasons, they had been allowed to have sexual relations infrequently and only with women in their forties or early fifties, if the latter were strong and healthy people. These sexual restrictions began to break down during the post-puberty period of the age-grade

which is presently in its twenties—that is since about 1945—while the food restrictions have been partly disregarded only by the current initiation class—that is, from 1955. Since achievement in any adult role is believed to be based on the extent to which a man maintained his puberty restrictions, the effect of this trend on the behavior of future generations may be critical, a fact which is often being deplored by the elders in their council meetings.

The use of body decorations is going out of practice, and some men want to wear shorts or long pants instead of the loin cloth or of simply going naked. Several youths in their twenties and their late teens have not had their ears pierced, and one has even had his lobes surgically mended while staying with the Indian Protection Service in Rio de Janeiro. The six Canelas employed by the Post wear long pants consistently, as requested, though they may go naked for dances in the village. Often men will approach the plaza wearing a loin cloth only to remove it upon joining the dancing group or for performing a role in a festival in order to feel more in keeping with the way of the ancestors (Nimuendaju, p. 47).

Women above about ten years of age never go naked any more, although for performing a special role in a festival they may wear only the traditional belt with leaves tucked under it to cover the genitals. Even at the community bathing place they do not expose themselves any longer than is necessary before slipping quickly into the water after throwing off their cloth. The men wait their turn watching occasionally from about thirty yards away.

Since a few years after the arrival of the Indian Service personnel in 1941, "wantons," or unmarried women (Nimuendaju, p. 130), have not slept in the plaza at night with the men. The Canelas are very sensitive to any criticisms of their sexual practices that are not consistent with the Christian principles of the *sertanejos*, and consequently they tend to conceal these customs or misrepresent them to avoid either embarrassing the visitor or being ashamed by him.

The large and straight race tracks (Nimuendaju, p. 38) are no longer cleared at all, although since 1956, by order of the Service, straight-of-ways from each of the two villages toward

the *sertanejo* community of Leandro have been opened through the sparsely treed savannah in order to facilitate the entry of trucks or jeeps. These visits occur not more than four times a year and have not seriously affected the Canelas, even though home-made toy trucks and even airplanes have become the most prized playthings of young boys.

Through the instruction at the post school, four young men have learned to read and write well enough in Portuguese to send and receive reasonably complicated messages quite effectively. One is the leader of his age-grade and is almost certain to be an important agent in the extensive reorientation that is likely to come about over a period of a few decades. To him and many of his age-graders, the important goal is to find a job through which to earn money on a salary basis. One of these has spent fifteen months employed by the Service both in the coastal cities and with a still sometime hostile tribe of Kayapó. Two others have spent eight months in the state capital, São Luiz, learning to read and write, and working on a Japanese-run vegetable farm while continually under the surveillance of the Service.

During the last four years, dancing as couples in the style of the *sertanejos* and the city dweller has become popular. At first certain men would dance only at the parties of the *sertanejos*, but in the last two years these dances have taken place in the villages of the Canelas and at the post. One youth is learning to play a small accordion as accompaniment. Skirts, blouses, fancy shoes, cosmetics, and jewelry, all in the *sertanejo* style, are being considered desirable to enhance these dances. It is interesting to note that such a party must take place indoors in the *sertanejo* fashion, even if it should become very crowded and hot, rather than in the moonlit plaza according to the Canela tradition. Nevertheless, on another evening there will be an animated dance in the plaza in the aboriginal style.

Group solidarity and social cohesion in Canela society was and still is high. Various ties bind the individual to his family, such as obligatory food exchanges, mutual economic support responsibilities, and food and sex tabus when another member is sick or in a crisis situation. On the ideological level, "giving to please the other" and "compromising to satisfy another" are

stressed values so that many conflicts are avoided or fail to continue for long. A man who is not getting his way easily will retreat, yielding to the other person involved, who is very likely to have gotten his way either because he showed great desire and consequently needed to be appeased, or because he was more strongly backed by the others who were present. Outlets for injured feelings can be found at least twice a day through expression in group meetings or in ceremonial occasions, and through the practice of making long speeches to one's relatives. Besides this, Canela traditional life offers recognition to the individual through achievement in a number of different roles and in a variety of forms of behavior, and furnishes constant sources of recreative activities and varying sexual outlets.

A factor contributing to the maintaining of social cohesion for which the Canelas are noted is now in the process of change. It can be found in the relationship of the individual to his various social groupings and activities. When not with his family, the Canela found himself continually involved in his age-grade life, the daily round of games and dances, and the frequent festivals. Today, however, a number of elements keep these group activities from taking place as continuously as they used to. The dysfunction between leaders and followers is significant in this respect. It has become necessary for a Canela to stay away from the village much of the time to beg or work in the *sertanejo* communities. The village has had to remain by the Service post instead of being moved to a place near the farm plots, so that many of the latter are so far away that their owners will only return to the village once a week. The obvious consequences are that the Canelas cannot assemble as often as they were accustomed to do, so that they are not as continually occupied by recreation and group activities as they were formerly.

THE FIRST TREND

The most general symptom of disturbance in the Canela social order is probably the partial breakdown of the forces of political and social authority. To examine this serious weakening in the lines of control, we must look into the recent history of the role of the chief.

In the last century, Canela society was military and authoritarian in nature. A chief was necessarily a man who exhibited fierce and dominating attitudes. He governed partly through putting fear into his followers, both a fear that he could best them in a fight (which never should occur) and a fear that he would not hesitate to publicly shame them if it were necessary in order to exact compliance. The chiefs in Nimuendaju's time were still sufficiently dominating to command the traditional respect and cooperation. Old Hąktokót of that era is said to have been well versed in shaming wrong-doers in the plaza. Usually, in the morning council meetings he used to plan just what each age-grade and what certain individuals would do during the day, and there was likely to be shame cast on the slackers or the disobedient persons in the evening if the assignments were not accomplished.

In the first years of the post of the Indian Protection Service, the Canelas produced a horticultural surplus, but since that time they have had to resort increasingly to begging and to taking on odd jobs in the local communities of the *sertanejos* to keep from starving between September and March. A factor contributing to this condition was that one Indian agent increasingly took over some of the functions of the chief, such as directing the age-grades to perform the necessary work in the farm plots. When he left, his successors in the Service were more easy-going so that they did not succeed in organizing the age-graders to do their traditional duties. Hąktokót by this time was sick and weak, and did not succeed in effectively reactivating the practice. Now, each father does his own work, alone with his sons-in-law and young unmarried sons, with the result that much less work is accomplished because the Canelas do not become motivated into sustained activity in conditions lacking group-produced gaiety.

With the death of the old chief in 1951, an era of strong leadership came to an end, and with it disappeared much of the Canela autonomy and the very characteristic coordination between sub-groups.

In the selection of the deceased chief's successor, the Service passed over several popular and older Canela candidates to back a cooperative young man who could speak Portuguese

better than the others. Even if the young man were not influential, under the circumstances the Canelas would have had to accept him because they had come to recognize the authority of the Service as the highest order in their *own* hierarchy, higher than that of their chiefs. Since some time in the last century, the then distant government has approved the Canela-backed chiefs and treated them as subordinates, giving them the uniforms and the honorary ranks of army officers. This, however, was the first time that the Service has had a post by the village at the time of the making of a new chief as well as the first time that its personnel have played a role in the selection. This new chief, however, being only about thirty-five years old, was not able to command the leaders of the older age-grades effectively, so that his influence was largely neutralized, and he lost much of the rest of it through not keeping his promises and in setting a bad example by becoming drunk too often.

The division of the tribe into two villages which occurred in 1955 was partly due to personal rivalries between the young chief and the older age-grade leaders. This partitioning often cut the uncle-nephew and the ceremonial friendship ties, further weakening the socialization process and the social structure. It also reduced the number of people in each community so that the daily dances and the singing in the boulevard could not be carried on with as much gaiety, further contributing to the general demoralization.

Besides this weakening in the lines of political control, other disruptions in the forces of authority have been occurring. In the relationships between the old and the young, the maternal uncles and their nephews, and the fathers and their children, the attitude of the seniors toward their juniors has become lenient and undemanding. For instance, in Nimuendaju's day, a councilor who saw a youth in the plaza smoking, making rowdy noises, or flirting with young girls, would give the lad a sound lecture and order him to go away. In these times, however, the elders do not do this for fear that the younger ones might rudely direct their attention elsewhere or that they might even talk back. In August of 1960, a striking break with the past occurred on two consecutive evenings. The age-group in their twenties, who customarily sit on the western edge of the plaza

to hold their meetings, took up a position beside the elders who were holding a council in the center of the plaza as is their custom (Nimuendaju, p. 91). Though the youths were so close that their words carried well into their seniors' circle, distracting the latter's attention from the business of the meeting, the councilors did not require the young men to return to their usual place.

THE SECOND TREND

Let us examine the shift from the maternal uncle to the father of the role of disciplining the nephew. The ramifications of this quantitative change can be traced far into other areas of culture so that it can be seen as contributing to the causing of the most serious interfamilial conflicts of today and as lessening the popularity of the festival system.

In the days of Curt Nimuendaju's visits, the maternal uncle who had given a name to a nephew still played a strong and extensive role in the latter's socialization, although earlier his treatment had been more severe. While the father and the mother handled general behavioral problems, this naming uncle was responsible for dealing with the ceremonial, sexual, food restriction, legal, and other major disciplinary crises of the boy or youth. Other maternal uncles carried out the same role less seriously. Until about 1915, there had been a considerable amount of what can be called "hazing" in the relationship between the uncle and the nephew he had named. Often, when the uncle had caught the youth breaking food restrictions or paying attention to young women, or when he just felt like hazing his nephew for general disciplinary reasons, he would stage a dramatic scene. In the late afternoon when the young men were dancing in the plaza in front of a line of singing girls (Nimuendaju, p. 116), the uncle would approach the group and cause the performance to stop abruptly. Then he would call the young nephew out from among his dancing mates and station him in front of and facing the line of women who by now were silent and serious in their respect for the gravity of the situation. With these women and girls looking on, the uncle would scold and shame the lad verbally. Then he might stamp on the nephew's feet or yank his long hair unmercifully. More

drastic punishments were putting peppers in the boy's mouth, pulling a skin-cutting grass blade rapidly under his armpit drawing blood, and pulling back the foreskin of his penis so that all the women could see the glans. If the youth showed openly any signs of pain, shame, or rebellion, he would later find it difficult to arouse female attentions. According to several informants, by the time of Nimuendaju this institution had almost disappeared though it is said to have been performed some times in a manner lacking severity. With the arrival of the Indian Protection Service personnel and their families, the custom was abandoned.

The decrease in the practice of hazing can be seen as a factor in the progressive weakening of the authoritative influence of the naming uncle and of maternal uncles in general. With this role in his maternal home becoming less important, and from the example of the *sertanejos* who live alone with their wives, the uncle took to spending less time with his mother and sisters and more time in the house of his wife, a practice which today is adhered to even more by couples of the age-grade in their twenties. Consequently, he is not present consistently enough in the house of his female relatives to prevent the teen-age nephews from neglecting their food restrictions. However, he will still go to his maternal home to settle a major interfamilial dispute, or to discuss the contracting of the marriage or divorce of any of his nephews or nieces. Even today, the father must keep out of such family councils, but the absence of the maternal uncles often leaves to the father by default many responsibilities and decisions that used to be in the hands of his spouse's brothers and especially the naming uncle.

Even the father, however, is treating his children in a milder manner than he used to do. Although he has taken over some of the functions of the uncles, his attitude toward handling his children seems to have shifted consistently along with the general trend toward moderation or non-action exhibited in the carrying out of all authoritative relationships.

This shift between the roles of the maternal uncle and the father is especially significant in the manner in which it has affected other institutions. For instance, it is one of the factors contributing to the increase in sexual jealousy among the youths

in their late teens and their twenties, a type of conflict which has become more frequent and serious than any other during the past few years. To understand the development of this source of disagreement, it is necessary to consider some traditional aspects of the Canela institution of marriage.

Before the turn of the century, the young married Canela spent very little time with his wife or even in the family house of his spouse. The constant age-grade and group activities occupied his time and thoughts. He, with his age-graders, continually played with and had sexual relations with the women of the other moiety—after the dances in the boulevard in the day time, an hour before the afternoon log races, or on opposite sides of the plaza at night—while the men of the other young age-grade of the opposite moiety reciprocated by playing with the wives of the men of the first moiety. Consequently, the young husband and his wife went their own ways in different groups most of the time until the first child arrived. The strong advice of the chiefs, of the age-grade leaders, and of the uncles, as well as the climate of continual social activities in which the youths were involved, all served to keep sexual jealousy at a minimum, even during the time of Nimuendaju when the Canelas were already learning of such behavior from the example of the *sertanejos*. Now, however, these authoritative influences have lost their strength, and the young husband will make a great fuss because of any infidelities, possibly demanding a payment as the prerequisite for his return to his wife's house. The parents of the girl are in sympathy with him, especially the father, who depends a great deal on the work of the younger man for the support of the family. Moreover, the parents have always been ashamed to deal with the sex life of their children and so prefer to avoid any embarrassing row with the son-in-law's family for this reason. On the other hand, the paternal aunts and the maternal uncles find it fun to further the amorous adventures of their nieces and nephews. With the lessening of the influence of the maternal uncles, however, and the relative gain in control by the father, secret trysts are becoming more difficult to arrange.

In the last part of the nineteenth century, and in the times of Nimuendaju, the extramarital rendezvous was the custom

for both sexes, with its discovery by the spouse resulting only in loud scoldings and temporary separations. It was not, however, considered as accepted grounds for fights, or a justification for divorce if the couple were raising children of their own (Nimuendaju, p. 128). This year, one youth who had caught his fifteen-year-old wife merely flirting with another boy at the public bathing place, demanded a sizeable payment to "put an end to the shame that was passed onto his face," and won the case with many of the important councilors of the tribe giving advice on both sides.

This shift in attitude toward sexual practices is making it difficult for even the institutionalized and festival-supported extramarital practices to be carried out when they have high social visibility, such as the inter-moiety exchange of wives at the ending of both of the initiation festivals and on the first day of the Winter Season (Nimuendaju, p. 169).

In the Fish Festival, the *tepyarkwá*, given in February of 1960, not all of the required number of girl associates for the men's societies were obtained. The councilors first chose a list of girls, and when the tribe had assembled in the late afternoon they sent couriers to stop by the houses of these girls to escort them to their stations among their plaza groups. Some of the parents of the girls on this first list refused to let their daughters go out to fill the offices, knowing that the men of the societies would be bound to require sexual attention and that even in the time of a festival when sexual license was the tradition, this would be likely to cause strife with the contracted son-in-law. The councilors then had to call on girls who were below and above the customary age level in the hope of filling all the posts, but they only succeeded in completing eleven out of thirteen of these traditional positions. Two companies received only one girl associate instead of the customary two per group. This type of behavior is undermining the festival system which, though secularly oriented, functions in many ways as a religion for the concretely thinking Canelas.

These pageants serve to teach the youths and to reinforce the roles of the older people. Also, they are particularly important in that they animate and put joy into the lives of the youths. Gaiety, joy, and fun are some of the highest Canela values. Any number of times informants have lamented that there

were not enough girls taking active parts in the festivals and that without them and the consequent scarcity of sex play, there was little gaiety, and that the festival activities were becoming sad. Quite clearly, the growth of this new Canela attitude toward sex threatens to diminish the youth's interest in the festival system of his ancestors. If these pageants were forgotten, the Canela would lose the pattern for his tribal solidarity, the many parts of which are dramatized in the numerous acts of these performances.

SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

A report on the present conditions among the Canela Indians has been presented for those interested in the well known monograph of Curt Nimuendaju, *The Eastern Timbira*. Since his time, there have been relatively few qualitative changes, but several significant shifts in the relative importance of certain values and roles have induced a number of quantitative changes, the ramifications of which have reached into many important areas of the culture, bringing about sub-group dysfunction and the malpractice of traditional forms.

Understanding how this came about is of primary importance to those interested in cultural change. The following analysis will be stated in a tentative manner because the data have not yet been fully analyzed. According to evidence collected from the over-all cultural system, it appears that in the Canela Indians we have a case in which many factors (geographic, economic, political, etc.), which usually operate to further acculturation, have contributed instead toward maintaining conservatism. Besides this, the degree of social cohesion is relatively high, guaranteeing sufficient personal satisfactions for a majority of the people and an absence of disrupting internal strife. On the other hand, over the period of the last sixty years, contacts with the *sertanejos* and exposure to alien ideas have brought about modifications in certain kinds of valuing, such as the liking for fierce authoritative behavior and the favoring of generous attitudes in the area of sexual rights. These external influences together with the value changes have contributed to raising many serious doubts about the way of their ancestors in the minds of the elders, so that they lack conviction in their teaching and handling

of the youths. Similarly, but more recently, these types of experiences have been generating a number of new and alternative ideas among the young people so that they are thinking their elders do not know about the really important things. Consequently, the younger generation has little motivation either to listen or to comply, and the elders often are afraid of being rebuffed if they should try to teach or discipline the youths. The result has been both sub-group and inter-generational dysfunction and the malpractice of certain traditions such as puberty restrictions.

Another source of dysfunction has been the dependency relationship on the Service personnel which has been a factor in the loss of political autonomy and in ability for economic self-support, leaving the Canelas increasingly unsure of themselves in moments when they are required to take active steps in handling asocial or anti-traditional situations.

It appears that as of 1960 quantitative changes are more characteristic of the Canela acculturative picture than qualitative ones because the conserving factors are strong, allowing only for shifts rather than for sharp breaks. Moreover, the external influences favoring acculturation have been exerted only as mild pressures over a long period of time with few specific changes having been forced on the Canelas to upset their cultural equilibrium. Operating in a conservative setting, these types of contacts have merely brought about tribal dependence and limited social dysfunctioning, conditions that render coordinated action very difficult so that neither a program of unified conservatism nor a course of organized cultural change with sharp breaks with the past could be adopted. In these circumstances, it can be seen that the Canelas adapt to acculturative pressures by adjusting an old usage into keeping with the changed values through letting it drift gradually toward a prestigious *sertanejo* form or toward a kind of behavior that requires less personal discomfort and gives a more immediate pleasure such as disregarding food restrictions. In this characteristic pattern of adaptation through gradual shifts, it can be seen that a traditional practice is merely being modified, remaining in the same general form—a quantitative change—whereas the passing outside of the limits of the ancestral complex or the adoption of a usage

with a mostly novel set of antecedents—a qualitative change—seldom can occur.

In conclusion, it appears that more qualitative changes would have been produced if the external influences had been more abrupt and more forceful, if the internal social cohesion had been much weaker, or if the Canela autonomy and authoritative lines had been maintained so that advantageous changes could have been selected and adopted, as in the cases of the Manus Islanders and Redfield's people of Chan Kom.

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TWENTIETH CENTURY SPANISH EXPATRIATES IN CUBA: A SUB-CULTURE?*

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There have been very few modern anthropological studies made in Cuba; none, to my knowledge, on urban class structure or movements. Perhaps the comparative absence of Indians there has caused research workers to bypass it. Other studies have mainly concerned themselves with analyzing historical data or with plotting africanisms in Cuba. Now that a new revolution has disturbed the social structure on that island the Spanish expatriate is taking a new look, perhaps an apprehensive look, at his place in that structure. This paper is an attempt, preliminary and descriptive, to assess the role he has played in the twentieth century.

Ever since the sixteenth century rule of the Catholic Kings the Spanish system has at least required previous authorization for emigration from the Iberian peninsula when it did not prohibit it. Many of these restrictions were lifted in 1853; thereafter, during the nineteenth century, a great wave of emigration began to the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines as well as to other Ibero-American countries such as the Argentine—still the point of highest preference today.

The reasons for coming to Cuba in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were simple. The Spaniard may have been sent by his government in an official position or as a member of the military occupying forces (at least until 1898) and later resigned or defected from his post to settle there in a civilian capacity; this was certainly true of many Spanish soldiers after the Cuban War of Independence. Many have told me that one of the most potent reasons for emigration from Spain was to avoid military service especially during the unpopular African wars in Morocco in 1859, 1893, 1909, 1911 and 1920. Moreover, exile from the homeland can be either voluntary or imposed but the line is hard to draw in some cases. One of the direct effects of the Spanish Civil War was the move from Spain of many thousands

*A field trip to Mexico and Cuba in 1960 was undertaken as a Fellow under the Organization of American States program.

of persons, soldiers and civilians, who did not sympathize with Franco. It is true that many went to Mexico rather than to Cuba because of the special conditions of entry allowed them by the then President of Mexico—Cárdenas. Those who did come to Cuba seem to have integrated well and quickly adopted Cuban citizenship.

The greatest reasons, however, for leaving Spain to settle in Cuba have always been those of a disturbed economy and an increase in aspirations. Galicia, Asturias and the Canary Isles¹ are the three areas of Spain which have traditionally supplied most of Cuba's expatriates at least since the 1850's. During the period 1911 to 1958 Galicia provided a yearly average of 47.68% of the total emigration from Spain (Ministerio de Trabajo 1960: 61). Between 1946 and 1957 out of every thousand persons in the province of Pontevedra (Galicia) one hundred and ten emigrated; in Santa Cruz de Tenerife (Canary Isles) the figure was even higher—one hundred and twenty-five out of every thousand. There really lay open only two alternatives to the Galician peasant; either to wait for his father to die and then share in the small family patrimony (except in provinces like Lugo where there was a traditional primogeniture), or to emigrate.

It is not surprising that the word 'Gallego' as used in Cuba conjures up the archetype of the poverty-stricken arrival on Cuban shores in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, his feet clad in rope-soled sandals, his manner illiterate, his labour unskilled, his pockets empty. In 1906-7 we find that out of a total 22,178 Spanish immigrants 17,737 were illiterate; 18,261 were men; and whilst 20,087 had paid their own passage 15,254 had brought less than 30 pesos with them. Few of their women folk accompanied them; the ratio has always been about 2:1 in favour of the men, for it was the men who came "to make America."

One of the earliest (1871) Spanish associations to be founded in this period was the Sociedad de Beneficencia de Naturales de Galicia. An on-going concern even now it is a charitable organization originally composed of thirty-seven rich Galicians who gave assistance of all kinds (including paying the passage home for the sick) to their less fortunate compatriots. The officers of this

¹The Canary Isles were also a testing ground for the acclimatization of Mediterranean crops and for adapting social and political institutions for the Indies, since the 15th century.

association declare that their organization greatly stimulated Spaniards throughout Cuba to emulate its activities and thus provide a 'cushioning' insurance during the difficult period of adjustment by new arrivals. There are thirteen of these charitable societies in Havana alone, representing different regions or provinces of Spain.

Shortly afterwards, in 1879, the Centro Gallego was founded to serve as a sort of employment bureau, night-school and social centre. It differs from the purely charitable organizations in that it is a mutual aid-in-benefit society. Over 55,000 members pay a monthly minimum of approximately three pesos (\$3 U.S.) which not only entitles them to the use of a palatial building in Havana for social and recreational purposes but also to a most comprehensive scheme for all types of medical treatment for themselves and their families. The Centro Asturiano is a similar organization with over 90,000 members. Another association was founded on the criterion of occupation, specifically for store-assistants (over 70,000 members), and this was taken over by the Castro government in the summer of 1960. One more was founded on the criterion of sex through the initiative of the women from Galicia and their daughters; this has over 30,000 members. Only expatriates from Galicia, Asturias, the Canary Isles and Castilla (with the lowest membership—some 10,000) have set up these regional organizations of such magnitude with a hospital attached, a home for the aged and a separate pantheon for burial. Other associations are mainly social centres, and of the southern provinces in Spain only Andalusia is represented; the Centro Andaluz, founded 1919, has just decided to terminate its activities and disband because of lack of funds and new members.

Two other associations are worthy of note for they cross-cut the usual territorial link. The Casino Español in Havana, with less than 2,000 members, is a rather exclusive club for the richer and more aristocratic. Founded in 1869 as a political association it changed its aims after Cuba won her independence in order to 'promote union between Cubans and Spaniards, exalt the cultural values of Spain and Cuba and provide all types of recreation'. It has a definite upper class pattern and is the only centre I know of that has an historical armoury and fencing academy. A few doors away in the same street, the Circulo Republicano Español,

founded in 1925 as a protest against the monarchy in Spain, has as its avowed major aim to propagate against the Franco regime; again, the fall-off in immigrants has meant that its membership has dropped to 400 from a previous high of 2000. The two Basque and the two Catalan associations are similarly divided on political lines. Negroes and Chinese are barred from entry to any of the Spanish associations but a few foreigners of European extraction are found on the membership books. In general, membership is limited to those born in Spain, their children and their grandchildren.

Although the Centro Asturiano has its headquarters in Havana it is represented in the provinces of Cuba by 109 delegations. But more important perhaps is the fragmentation within the parent body itself on territorial lines. The Centro Asturiano of Havana has forty-two autonomous associations based on *comarcas* or local zones in these Spanish regions. Each has an office or desk in the main 'centro'; each celebrates the patron saints' days of its homeland municipalities, villages or parishes by a fiesta starting with morning Mass and then continuing with a formal luncheon, speeches and dancing in a picnic-like atmosphere. These celebrations are faithfully and glowingly written up in the Cuban press by Spanish columnists. Likewise the Centro Gallego has fifty-seven such *comarca* associations. It is probable that many if not all of these *comarca* associations began as veritable *cofradías*, that is as sodalities with, in many cases, a mutual-aid-in-burial function. However, there remains only the skeleton of the basic Spanish fiesta, which I have described elsewhere², and in which *cofradías* have traditionally played such an important role. Though the members of these *comarca* associations rarely meet as a body more than a few times a year they serve as important channels of communication with the Spanish homeland.

In 1953, out of the total population in Cuba of 5,829,029, the census designated 74,561 (approximately 1.3%) as Spaniards—the greatest foreign element there³; whereas in the year 1899, Spaniards constituted approximately 8.3% of the total population. Their distribution by provinces for 1953 was as follows: La

² See Kenny, "A Spanish Tapestry: Town and Country in Castile".

³ The next highest foreign elements were 27,543 from Haiti, 14,421 called 'ingleses' which probably includes Canadians as well as British, and 11,834 called Chinese.

Habana (28,055), Las Villas (17,226), Camaguey (13,446), Oriente (10,327), Matanzas (3,834), and Pinar del Rio (1,673). Only in La Habana do females (15,699) outnumber the males (12,356). Merely by totalling up the membership of the many Spanish associations it can be seen that there are many more than 74,561 who although they may not have retained their Spanish nationality at least were either born in Spain or would appear to centre their interests in things Spanish. I should qualify this to some extent by saying that a closer study might show that simple membership of these associations does not always and necessarily suppose a preference for the Spanish rather than the Cuban but simply a realistic awareness of the benefits (particularly medical and social) that such membership entails.

Certain general observations can be made on the bases of statistics and field work. The highest proportion of Spanish expatriates who now work on the land in Cuba without doubt originally came from the Canary Isles; the provinces of Camaguey and Las Villas, the heart of agriculture and pastoralism in Cuba, have absorbed most of them. Numbers of Spaniards, about whose regional origin and strength I have no data, did come as seasonal sugar plantation workers during the 'dance of the millions' boom in the early 1920's but it appears that the majority of these returned to Spain. In general, however, the twentieth century Spanish expatriate tends now to settle in urban centres; the the erstwhile agricultural labourer is being slowly replaced by the commercial employee and, of late (1946-57), by the industrial worker with his dependent women folk and children (Ministerio de Trabajo; 1959:36). The Instituto Español de Emigración in Spain makes definite efforts to unify the family during the whole process of emigration.

Spanish women expatriates tend to congregate in the more densely populated areas; the extremes of Havana (where they are most numerous) and Pinar del Rio (where they are fewest) clearly show this. Many of the Spanish women are unmarried on arrival, live a more independent life than they might do in Spain, and are less reliant on a supporting kin group for their livelihood. Indeed, despite a rise in the number of immigrants already married on arrival, most Spanish expatriates tend to marry Cubans—a popular saying suggests that the Cuban women 'sweeten' the Spanish character—and marry at a later age than they normally

would in their homeland. Only the upper-class Spaniards, especially those claiming aristocratic lineage and with their hearts (though not necessarily their incomes) in Spain, have endogamous tendencies or even perhaps seek a spouse for their son or daughter in Spain itself. One might also suggest that there is a greater readiness on the part of the twentieth century Spanish expatriate to adopt Cuban citizenship, (especially since 1933); in 1899, only 23 persons of Spanish birth had become Cuban citizens while the citizenship of another 28,589 was in 'suspense' (Cuban Census 1899; 104).

It was the 1933 Ley Provisional de Nacionalización that greatly slowed down Spanish immigration for it required that at least 50% of all employees should be Cuban, with the exception of certain technicians and executive staff. Prior to the effective functioning of his regional associations the Spanish immigrant rarely had a job on arrival. Later with the help of the associations' employment services and of already well-established relatives or fellow villagers he was often channelled into an occupation which, however, was not always of his own choosing. Spaniards have long been active in the commerce of textiles and at one time, before they were largely displaced by Cuban Jews, the Calle de La Muralla in the old quarter of Havana was lined with their retail clothing stores. Here the new arrival would work, eat and sleep on the premises with a minimum of comfort and spare time, under the disciplinary patriarchal care of his patron. It is not a life that the post-World War II immigrant would easily accept.

Lacking the stimulus and new blood of regular immigrant arrivals the Spaniards in Cuba began to lose their almost exclusive hold in some fields such as commerce and banking. So too the fortunes of many Spanish associations in the provinces began to decline. I have visited many Spanish 'centros' in Cuba; some, such as that in Trinidad, have less than 100 members of whom possibly a dozen are active, and this activity is largely confined to playing dominoes in the evenings. All the older Spaniards deplore this state of affairs which is beyond their grasp to control. With rare exceptions their sons, born in Cuba, do not share the waning enthusiasm of their fathers nor indeed their nostalgia for things Spanish; only in Havana and Santiago did I find Cuban sons of Spanish parents as presidents of thriving Galician (in both cases) 'centros'. Indeed, there are cases where the *criollo* sons of Spaniards veer to an extreme Cuban nationalism incompatible with

the family's Spanish ties. Dr. Castro is, after all, the son of a successful Galician expatriate.

It is in fact the ties that the Spaniard maintains with his homeland and, in particular, with his natal pueblo or parish that help to maintain the 'Spanishness' of his way of life in Cuba and consequently, I suggest, impede his wholesale integration into that culture. The strength of these ties is manifested in various forms. Almost every sizable Spanish association publishes a monthly magazine, for instance *El Progreso de Asturias* or *Canarios en Cuba* or *La Vida Gallega en Cuba*, which not only has news of the local Spanish 'colony' but also numerous items of local interest from their homeland Spanish provinces. There is no doubt that this acts to cohere them into a non-Cuban group although ties of amity and mutual interest with their Cuban cousins are constantly reiterated. More important, however, is the strengthening of ties with the homeland through the continual flow-back to Spain of expatriate money or donations to their families or to their old municipalities.

The founding of welfare and charitable organizations in the New World predated anything of its kind in Spain and presents a clear example, not only of what necessity can do, but of concerted action of a disinterested and civic nature, extremely rare among Spaniards. Fully aware of his disadvantages and lack of preparation when he first emigrated, the Spanish expatriate is anxious to make up for this in some way by founding schools or providing scholarships back in his village of origin. His generosity is also directed to beautifying his village by building a village fountain or renovating the parish church. One might argue that such action has an effect contrary to the interests of the expatriate, in that it diminishes the incentive to emigrate and so lessens the numbers in the Spanish 'colonies' in Cuba. There is no ulterior motive, I believe, to reduce competition in this way. Rather, it would appear that apart from a genuine interest in seeing his Spanish village progress in some way the expatriate is also eager to gain prestige for himself and his family some of whom may still be living there. The act of emigration does not automatically confer prestige; on the contrary, the New World emigrant is usually referred to, somewhat scornfully, as an *indiano* by his villagers and on his visits or return to the village he must often strive to reintegrate himself. The personal tragedy of the expatriate in many cases is

that he is an outsider to both his original and his recipient culture; he has left the one and never fully immersed himself in the other. The ties he maintains with his homeland and his nostalgia give him a temporary view of his settlement in Cuba; yet in fact he rarely returns to Spain forever and his last gesture of loyalty to his motherland is to be buried in a Spanish pantheon.

Spain no longer imposes or insinuates elements of its cultural traits into Cuba: it is no longer a conquest or a donor culture in Foster's terms (Foster, 1960:12). Whether or not they have adopted Cuban citizenship, the Spaniards in Cuba might be said to constitute a sub-culture though a dying one. On the whole they have avoided politics and, especially during the present revolution, have declined to take sides publicly. But their strong position in the so-called middle sector, especially of the commercial economy, is being adversely affected by the rural and urban reform laws of the Castro government. As in all revolutions, there is a strong feeling against foreigners and Spaniards certainly answer this description in Cuban eyes today. Spanish business men complain of the activities of *chivatos* ('stoold pigeons') amongst their Cuban staff whom they fear will report unfavourably to the INRA (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, an organization with much wider powers than its name suggests) and thus institute the process of 'intervención' or being taken over by the revolutionary government. This latter process has already taken its toll in many instances and has even overtaken at least two Spanish associations, to my knowledge. One should bear in mind that these associations employ large numbers of Cubans on their medical and clerical staff but, in addition, two or three hundred Spaniards in each association bear the brunt of the administrative work on a purely voluntary basis. It is doubtful if they would be willing or even allowed to do so if these associations become organs of the Cuban state.

Only associations of a specifically left-wing character such as the Circulo Republicano Español seem to make real attempts to ally themselves to the cause of the present revolutionary government. They do this by entertaining members of that government at formal receptions or by donating funds to further agrarian reform and to help buy weapons for the defense of Cuba. That these donations are small is unimportant. Such associations tend to ad-

mit more non-Spaniards to their ranks than others and therefore have less of an exclusive Spanish nature.

I am quite aware that the associational tendency of twentieth century Spanish expatriates in Cuba is not sufficient evidence in itself to permit them and their families to be called a sub-culture. Yet a lengthier and more detailed study might well have produced extra evidence to support this thesis. Such a study is extremely difficult under the present circumstances in Cuba and raises methodological problems of urban research not yet satisfactorily resolved by anthropologists.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND MOBILITY IN CUBA¹

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The only study of Cuban social organization with any claim to comprehensiveness is Lowry Nelson's "Rural Cuba", 1950. Nelson suggests that although lower, middle and upper classes may be distinguished according to the usual objective criteria, the subjective evaluations of Cubans pointed to only two classes, upper and lower. While making it clear that Cuban society was far from rigid and its two classes by no means homogeneous, Nelson (1950:147) discusses vertical mobility and the dynamics of inter-class relations only with reference to the labor movement. The most striking aspects of this problem belonged in fact to the urban scene and thus fell outside the scope of his study. Nelson also omitted discussion of the paternalistic concept of government as a factor in the definition of classes; this also is most significant in urban contexts.

Urban society was marked by the activity and diversity of what has been described, for other parts of Latin America, as the middle sector, which was defined and created by the class dichotomy but was not itself in any useful sense a class. This essay will explore briefly the history and composition of the middle sector, and certain economic and political aspects of urban social structure in Cuba, with the intention not of achieving a thorough analysis in so short a space but of indicating the outlines of the subject and the nature of the material available for study. To simplify the presentation the past tense will generally be used, except when the reference is specifically to current events; but despite the thoroughness of Fidel Castro's schemes for social reform many of the phenomena to be discussed persist unchanged or may be expected to recur in the future.

No comparisons between Cuba and other parts of Latin America, will be attempted except, occasionally, by implication. The principal differences between Cuba and most of the countries for

¹ This paper is based on reading and on discussion with informants conducted in connection with a program of research at the American University, Washington, D. C. I am indebted to Michael Kenny of the Catholic University of America for information on the Spanish societies, and to my colleagues at the American University for numerous helpful discussions.

which the "middle sector" has been described may be attributable to the absence of an indigenous agrarian population and of a *mestizo* culture; and to differences in the timing of such events as independence from Spain and the expansion of the industrial sector.

Economic Background: Class Membership. The events which led to the social and economic situation prevailing more or less unchanged through the 1930's and early 1940's are reviewed by Nelson (1950:79-106). By 1925, major capital investment was controlled by a relatively small upper class, partly Cuban and partly foreign, whose interests were supervised, typically, by boards of directors rather than directly by individual owners. However, the sugar boom had collapsed, with several important consequences. The entire economy, precariously dependent on sugar, offered little security to those of moderate means and little encouragement to new departures; the small-scale farmer was threatened with extinction. In 1926, a period of economic regulation by legislation was initiated by the Verdeja Act, which reduced sugar production by 10%. In urban areas, increasing amounts of capital, largely from the United States, were being invested in utilities and heavy industry. But small-scale investment was discouraged by political instability, excessive bureaucratic interference, and the cautious Cuban preference for investment in real estate. Some improvement was apparent in the late 1940's and early 50's, but not enough to affect the basic economic pattern or the division of society into upper and lower classes with a disproportionately small middle class.

Some indication of the size of the lower class in the 1950's may be gained from figures in the 1953 census relating to standards of living and education. 43% of houses relied on natural water sources; 23% had no sanitary facilities, 55.6% were without baths or showers. 23.6% of those ten years of age or older were illiterate, even by the simplest test. These figures are also significant in terms of class identification, discussed below. Unemployment ranged from about 8% at the height of the sugar harvest to about 25% in the remaining eight months of the year.

The lower class was divided into two segments: those who were permanently employed by enterprises and were organized into effective unions capable of obtaining guarantees and priv-

ileges from the government; and those who worked for themselves, for small enterprises, or casually, and were not well organized. The majority of rural workers fell into the latter category, in which organization was inhibited by the low average income level, the excess of available labor, and poor government supervision of small enterprises. Organized workers on the other hand, who first made their political strength felt in 1933 against Machado, were relatively secure.

The middle class also included, from the 1930's to the 1950's, two roughly distinguishable segments: the commercial, dominated by Spaniards, and the technical and professional. The commercial segment included many who had made their way upwards from humble beginnings "by the use of their elbows", in the disparaging Cuban phrase; its members depended chiefly on trade for their income, although typically they owned urban or rural property as an investment. The technical and professional segment included some Spanish and other immigrants of the 1930's, but was predominantly *criollo* (native); its members depended on income from fees and salaries, particularly the latter. Many of them were also self-made men, but in a different sense from the commercial segment; they were educated, intellectual, and qualified for public administrative and political office. Some came from lower class families, but most from the middle class; frequently, like José Martí and Fidel Castro, these intellectuals were *criollo* sons of Spanish parents. Technicians became important in the middle class only from about 1920 onwards when the collapse of sugar prospects encouraged other industrial investment.

The upper class included the "old aristocracy" and the parvenus; it was distinguished relatively by the size of the enterprises it controlled. The old aristocracy included a small number of families whose prominence dated from the colonial period, some of whom considered themselves still to be Spanish and evinced pride in their genealogies; but on the whole the consolidation of this group dated from the sugar boom of 1917. It owned land, but such ownership was not essential to the status of its members. Membership was achieved by birth or marriage. The parvenus, on the other hand, owed their success to several sorts of enterprise, including commercial, industrial, professional and political enterprise. Of these the last was probably the most important; the

parvenus were, above all, men of the era of Batista, although not all by any means were his supporters. Both upper class groups were politically, economically and socially oriented towards the United States and other sources of foreign capital and political strength.

The nation's largest industry was sugar, but the largest of the large enterprises controlled by the upper class—directly by the new, indirectly by the old—was government. Since 1933 the government had been entrusted with a wide range of social and economic functions; it was consequently the largest employer of the middle sector—specifically, of the professional segment of the middle class. Because of the social emphasis on intellectual education and the inadequate development of middle-scale enterprises, the middle class was characterized by chronic underemployment. Most professional men had more than one income-producing occupation. In this situation government employment became, in the words of the *Report on Cuba*, (IBRD, 1950), a form of social assistance. Approximately 80% of the 1949-50 budgetary expenditures were for salary payments. Pensions added another 8%.

"Pension payments are economic *transfer* payments—payments in return for which no current services are being performed. One can only guess at the percentage of salary payments that fall into the same economic category. Well-informed Cubans maintain that at least one in three—or recently some 30,000-40,000 government employees—are on the payroll but perform virtually no work. The effort of thousands more is at best a token effort."

"This situation reflects political patronage at the fact that during the last 25 years there has been chronic unemployment in Cuba and a lack of alternative jobs." (IBRD, 1950: 683.)

Settlement and Class Structure. Rural society was not centered on the hacienda, on a squirearchy. Despite its dependence on field crops, Cuba has not been (in the twentieth century) an agrarian society. Sugar production is an industry involving very little time and skill spent on cultivation as such; the chief demand for labor occurs at the time of the harvest. Something of the same is also true of coffee. The Cuban countryman, therefore, is not typically a farmer and in fact he has rejected opportunities to become one. He works for a wage, or to produce a cash crop; from the proceeds he buys his foodstuffs and other needs.

Rural society consisted almost entirely of members of the lower class. Structure of the rural economy offered little room for the development of distributive services and a rural middle class. Merchant money-lenders, industrial workers and technicians, absentee landowners (estates were commonly run by managers), lawyers, government officials and the like played important parts in the economy and organization of rural society. They were, however, entirely urban in their characteristic values and their places of residence, whether in towns or in the industrial communities (*bateyes*) of the sugar mills. Community studies indicating the patterns of relationship between peasant and urban patron are lacking, although Nelson gives some general indications. Rural social structure also apparently varies from region to region with the principal crops, but again functional details are lacking.

The 1953 census considered as urban dwellers all persons who lived in population clusters of 150 persons or more, if such clusters were provided with electricity and medical, legal and recreational services or were adjacent and functionally related to other clusters so provided. By these criteria urban houses included 18% without piped water, 5% with no sanitation, 35% without baths or showers; but according to the census authorities they serve to distinguish a way of life which is in fact markedly different from the rural. The difference apparently lies in the relative isolation of families in scattered *bohíos* and the lack of opportunity for upward social mobility in rural society.

There were two kinds of urban settlement: the ordinary city or town and the *batey*. In 1951, by law, all *bateyes* were considered urban if no less than a *caballería* (33.16 acres) of land next to the *batey* was designated for the development of an urban center. The population of a *batey* was commonly between 2,000 and 3,000, most of them unionized industrial workers, technicians and administrative staff permanently employed by the mill and housed near it. Towns of 2,000 to 5,000 population and large cities (over 50,000) are notably numerous in Cuba (Dyer 1957). 21% of the total national population live in the metropolitan area of Havana and its satellite cities. The total living in urban areas was approximately 57% in 1953.

Urban growth is attributable to two population trends, in addition to the greater natural increase of the urban population

itself, with its higher standard of living. Rural workers with poor prospects tend to move to the cities, where the chances of year-round casual labor are better and where women may also work. This may be described as a lateral movement. The majority of recent lower class arrivals in the cities lived in suburbs of shacks, sufficiently apart from legally regulated society that they apparently governed themselves, electing their own mayors. There are no urban community studies; descriptions of lower class living conditions among the better established of the poor are contained in Ames (1960), and Chailloux Cardona (1945). In 1953 nearly a fifth of urban dwelling units consisted of a single room, each housing an average of five people.

There was also a "vertical" social movement contributing to the growth of the cities, especially Havana. In the *bateyes* the sons of unionized workers, clerical staff, pharmacists, teachers and the like, had the advantages of urban life, especially schooling, medical care and the opportunity to advance through the administrative hierarchy of the sugar industry, the labor unions and other nationally organized substructures. The more successful entered local government and politics, which provided further channels of access to the upper class of the larger cities.

Social Structure. According to Nelson, it was doubtful whether a middle class existed in Cuba (1950:161). Cuban writers have deplored the absence of middle class solidarity and class consciousness (eg. Raggi Ageo 1951). The subjective attitudes of Cubans demarcated only two classes, upper and lower, commonly referred to as the rich and the poor. Other labels used referred to attributes and functions; "upper class" and "lower class" were not used. In a pattern derived from feudal Spain, the upper class included those who employed labor and did not themselves work with their hands. Their wives and daughters were provided with domestic help, or at least would not themselves enter domestic service. They recognized an obligation, social as much as religious, to make charitable gifts to the poor; such giving was done publicly, giving a ritual emphasis to the difference in status between donor and recipient. Family pride and tradition also played a part; those whose parents were of the upper class might continue to regard themselves as belonging to the same group although their material fortunes had declined. Income alone did not make

the difference; a clerical worker making less than a factory foreman would be likely to feel he ought to have domestic service, though the foreman felt no such obligation. Other expenditures, almost as obligatory as a tax and rather less easy to evade, were incurred on socially significant occasions, especially marriages and funerals.

After giving the description on which the above is based, with an indication of the approximate division of occupational types between the classes, Nelson challenges C. E. Chapman's description (Nelson 1950: 161). Chapman saw three classes: "At one extreme are the laborers, many of them negro or negroid. At the other are the landholding class, made up of people of white blood. In between are the men in the professions and the politicians, mostly white in the upper ranks, but containing a considerable proportion of negroid elements, notably among the holders of government soft jobs, or *botellas*." (Chapman 1927:587).

These two descriptions are not incompatible. Neither of them is based on an economic evaluation, though Chapman's may at first appear to be. The first is subjective and static, the second objective and dynamic. Chapman's "middle class" is in fact what J. J. Johnson (1958) and J. P. Gillin (1960) have described for other Latin American countries as the middle sector. Its existence, I suggest, is attributable at least partly, in Cuba, to the uncompromising demands of the upper class ideal.

In economic terms, the middle sector extends from the upper lower class—skilled workers, union leaders—to the "new" upper class. (The wealth and power of the "new" forbid that it be called the "lower upper"). It is noteworthy that Chapman, in his description of classes, omits to mention the commercial middle class, discussed by him elsewhere; the heart of the middle sector is what I have described above as the professional and technical segment of the middle class.² In ideal, that is in Nelson's terms all or nearly all of the middle sector belonged in the upper class in that they observed or felt they ought to observe the standards of "decent" living, including particularly the avoidance of menial employment and the employment of servants. In many cases the financial obligations of upper class status strained the budgets of

²After the time of Chapman's writing the upper class as a whole became less "landed" and more capitalistic; investment in real estate was still highly regarded but the properties were often located in Miami and New York.

middle income families. Even in the upper class saving was rare, debt usual. Emphasis was placed on financial outlays contributing to "the achievement and maintenance of identification with the upper class" (Nelson 1950:184). Social pressures thus intensified the material problems created by the chronic underemployment characteristic of the middle class.

One of the major expenses incurred by middle sector families was the cost of private school educations for their children. The upper class ideal required that the man of affairs be a man of culture, educated in the classical humanist tradition. At the university level the classical disciplines were medicine, law, architecture and engineering. In each field the graduate was entitled to an honorific prefix to his name, corresponding to the use of "Doctor" in English. In Cuba there was an excess of such graduates—although there would not have been if the economy and the society had been adapted to make efficient use of them.³ There were for example only 865 people per doctor, as compared with 1,615 in Venezuela and 5,530 in the Dominican Republic.⁴ This is the gross ratio. But 43% of the population lived in rural areas which by definition typically lacked medical services. Apart from professional practice graduates could enter the government, journalism, and university teaching. All were highly regarded occupations; some professional men practiced as many as four of them, and it was usual to have more than one at a time. Above all the government was the chief hope of the middle sector.

Politics and Patronage. The middle sector, far from showing any solidarity in the pursuit of common goals, was characterized by fierce internal competition for guarantees of economic security. In the pre-industrial colonial period family ties were the principal source of such guarantees. Later the largest employers were not family enterprises but corporately-owned industries operating on a huge and impersonal scale. Nepotism gave ground to professional bureaucracies. Government itself became so large an industry that there developed a tendency for allegiance to shift from the family to the political parties (Johnson 1958:10). In Cuba family connections remained important, especially in the lower

³Some varieties of engineer, for example industrial engineers, were however in short supply.

⁴These figures are taken from the useful tabulation in Almond and Colman 1960, Appendix.

and middle classes; the power conferred on labor by the government to regulate hiring and firing combined with the luddite attitude of the workers to make it difficult, in small enterprises, for a man to obtain employment who was not vouched for by one already employed there, usually a relative.

None of the political parties, with the exception of the Popular Socialist (Communist) Party had any pretensions to being other than a party of the middle sector. The lower class participated in political debate only as followers of middle sector politicians. The upper class, more specifically the "old" upper class, professed to despise politics; non-employment rather than underemployment characterized this group, and the necessary political contacts with the government were established privately and through associations and clubs. Much the same was true of the commercial segment of the middle class. Between the political parties violent disagreements developed, but coalitions formed and reformed with little respect for doctrinal differences.

The reward for political success was control of the industry of government. In the Spanish tradition, as C. E. Chapman remarked, public office was intended principally to benefit the holder; despite the efforts and public protests of many distinguished Cubans, this tradition has been consistently observed in practice. The perquisites of the governing faction included not only the distribution of government jobs but, notably, control of the national lottery, the awarding of government contracts and the manipulation of economic regulations. Skilful use of these powers meant not only the present enrichment of individuals but the promise of continued political support. The impressive scale of the resulting graft is recorded in Chapman (1929); IBRD (1950); White (1959).

Chapman devotes an entire, indignant chapter to the lottery; it has not been adequately treated since, but there is no evidence of considerable change (1929: 547-563). Lottery tickets were sold to some 2,000 collectors authorized to charge an almost unlimited mark-up on the face value of the ticket. Collectorships were a principal form of reward for political service; most of them were held by Congressmen, who usually had several each. In addition, the draw was frequently rigged. In the Zayas period the graft bill of the lottery alone ranged from 13 to 18% of the total government receipts from all sources (Chapman 1927:556).

In the award of government contracts "conflict of interest" was almost a requirement; in 1958 Batista's Minister of Public Works belonged to the firm of architects responsible for most of the recent conspicuous totalitarian extravagances in the Havana area, including the Havana Hilton, the National Theater, the Sports City and two hospitals which were the personal charitable undertakings of the First Lady of the Republic (de Cespedes 1958). In every city there were permanently unfinished buildings and other projects. The construction of hospitals benefited not only the engineers, the architects and the President but also the doctors, many of whom found employment as administrators. The Ministry of Health was not the least profitable branch of government. The Minister in 1958, a 1946 graduate of the University of Havana, combined medical practice with journalism and political organizing and was a subdirector of the *Renta de Lotería*.

On a small scale, the manipulation of economic regulations included such private arrangements as the granting of development concessions and the waiving of restrictions against firing a worker or employing a foreign citizen. On a larger scale the exchange of wage and employment guarantees and other legislated privileges for political loyalty between Batista and the major industrial unions is a classic example of its kind. Similar bargains were struck with investors' and employers' associations. This situation arose as a consequence of the twentieth century middle sector policy, accepted by all parties, of giving the State responsibility for economic conditions and welfare. "The laborer was encouraged to view any benefits he received as coming from the state and to conclude that his well-being . . . lay in political action rather than in direct negotiations with management". (Johnson 1958:9).

"Government soft jobs" were either *botellas* or *jamones*. "A *botella* was a post up to about the grade of section chief in which the occupant often did not occupy an office, his check being sent to his flat if his party service or familiar connections had been amply meritorious. Some flats got several checks." (White 1959: 142-144). A *jamon* is "a government job from about the rank of division chief to cabinet minister". The Ministry of Education offered perhaps the most blatant examples of the unscrupulous exercise of patronage. Hundreds of teaching jobs were filled just

before elections. Even the notorious Senator Masferrer had one at one time. Substitutes were employed in some cases. In addition, "hundreds of names of phantom teachers were on the pay-rolls, which explains in part the financial success of the Minister of Education". (White 1959:148).

Journalism remains as a major intellectual profession not yet accounted for. There were 8 persons per newspaper copy, as compared with 14 in Venezuela and 41 in the Dominican Republic (Almond and Colman 1960:Apdx); this again is a gross ratio. One quarter of the population was illiterate, half of it lived in rural areas where newspapers did not circulate. According to White (1959:150) government bribes to newsmen in Havana were at the rate of \$1 million monthly. In the 1920's such payments were made partly out of the proceeds of the lottery.

Associations. One of the more remarkable features of urban society was the proliferation of clubs and associations of which two types are of special issue. The benefit society may be described as characteristically a middle class institution; the professional or special-interest association, on the other hand, was a phenomenon of the middle sector. Of the mutual benefit social and insurance societies (*centros*) the oldest and best known were Spanish. Founded originally to look after recent immigrants from particular regions of Spain, the Spanish societies, later imitated by others, became huge multi-purpose institutions: recreation centers, patriotic fraternities, educational and cultural agencies, medical insurance cooperatives. Centro Asturiano and Centro Gallego, the largest, were housed in grandiose buildings in downtown Havana. With the relative decline of the purely Spanish element in the Cuban population the *centros* lost much of their Spanish character. During the 1950's the 90,000 members of Centro Asturiano included an estimated 30% Spanish-born, 10 to 15% Spanish by inclination and the rest Cubans. Some non-Spanish foreigners were admitted, but negroes and Chinese were excluded.

This racial exclusiveness was almost the only example of political or class-conscious activity in the *centros*. The members came from a wide range of middle-class, middle-income occupations, but most of them joined chiefly for the medical and educational benefits or for an occasional sociable evening playing dominoes.

Only on rare occasions when government policies threatened the operations of the *centros* did the corporate membership make any public showing of community of interest. The activists, from whom the voluntary administrative staffs were chiefly drawn, were the few for whom the Spanish orientation, the patriotic nostalgia, was important. The periodicals published by the *centros* as their corporate voices indicated this non-Cuban preoccupation; an issue of *La Nova Catalunya* published in late 1959, in Catalán, apparently contained no reference to current Cuban affairs.

The special-interest associations, many of them of small membership and very narrow appeal, were of very different character. They included professional, commercial and ethnic representative groups and, particularly as concerns the leadership, the labor organizations. Many were frankly political pressure groups providing their members with stepping stones to political and government office; this aspect was related to the multiple occupations of many of their members. Their meetings and the journals many of them published showed a similarly ambivalent preoccupation; articles written under solemnly scientific titles (especially on "sociographic" topics) often revealed themselves after a few paragraphs as political diatribes. Such associations also obtained for their members, and especially for their officers, government benefits in the form of pensions, business privileges, support grants and other concessions. They thus assisted the government in carrying out what the International Bank described as one of its principal functions, the distribution of public assistance, which was otherwise accomplished chiefly through the government service itself.

In return for their privileges most of the associations submitted to a degree of government supervision, commonly exercised through a national federation or front whose officers were in effect clients of the Chief of State. Potentially insurgent movements were thus nationalized. The history of the Cuban Labor Federation (C.T.C.) under Batista illustrates the process; a more specialized example is provided by the *Frente Cívica Contra la Discriminación Racial*, which effectively harnessed the reforming ambitions of the national federation of negro societies to the purposes of the C.T.C. leadership and ultimately of the government.

Such societies and federations, unlike the *centros*, were rapidly taken over by the new government after the Castro revolution; ultimately many of them were incorporated in the new national super-federation, the militia, into which much of the endemic Cuban enthusiasm for joining has been channeled.⁵

It is possible to gain some idea of the interlocking memberships of social clubs, professional associations and political parties in the 1940's and 1950's from social directories of Havana, of which there are a number, and from biographies. White (1959) refers in several places briefly, to the effects of the club system.

Revolution. The history of the middle sector is not of a class in relation to its corporate interests so much as of the collective success of a number of individuals and factions in the struggle to advance themselves, chiefly by political means, in a society tending to a rigid two-class division. The middle sector has consisted of people trying to achieve and maintain upper class status in competition with each other and in opposition to the corporate, relatively secure upper class. In the process they have appealed to the lower class, chiefly in nationalist terms, for mass support. Much of their political activity has been extra-constitutional and revolutionary; revolution was in fact a semi-legitimate expedient for which the penalty for the unsuccessful was merely a term of imprisonment. Successful revolutionaries became the new upper class in each generation—1898, 1933 and, apparently, 1959. Chapman's succinct description of the situation at the turn of the century is also a paradigm of later events: "The Spaniards may be the merchants, American and Cuban proprietors between them control the great agricultural resources of the island, but the leaders in the Army of Liberation have taken their reward in the 'ownership' of the government" (1927: 588).

The new upper class, the older generation of the middle sector, found it necessary to continue in party politics; but though it also continued to support reformist slogans its interests dictated a moderately conservative policy. The younger generation included those whose political and economic future was still uncertain—notably university students and recent graduates; from this group came the bomb-throwers and the purge committees. In the nineteenth

⁵Among the genuine volunteers in the militia in 1960 there were many who had been unable to fill prestigious roles in the old order, including a noticeably high proportion of negroes and middle-aged women.

century the two generations were represented by the conservative pro-slavery advocates of annexation to the United States, and by the radical nationalists. Both were opposed to continued Spanish rule, just as in the twentieth century both recognized the need to remove Machado in 1933 and Batista in 1958. In each case, however, the aftermath of the revolution saw a conflict between them concerning objectives and means.

Space is lacking for a discussion of the role of the army in the revolutionary process, but the situation in 1933 deserves mention. To overthrow Machado the army, the recently formed labor unions and the middle-class intellectuals united in pursuit of their several interests. The same movement which brought Grau San Martín and the *Directorio Estudiantil* to power, or at least to prominence, effected the replacement of the officers of the army by the sergeants who thus, led by Batista, advanced themselves to commissioned rank, upper class status and the perquisites of power.⁶

Apart from such graduation of individuals to higher status and new roles within an organization, the processes of mobility also involved the progress of entire organizations from radical intransigence to reactionary conservatism within the middle sector. In the nineteenth century the ideology of the nationalist opposition was borrowed chiefly from France; it was rationalist, deist, libertarian and anti-clerical. One of the leading organizations of the opposition was Freemasonry, which asserted the existence of universal moral truths accessible to the individual intellect without the intervention of ecclesiastical tradition and provided, in addition, ready-made facilities for subversive intrigue. The movement, tolerated until 1811 but clandestine thereafter, provided much of the symbolism of the nationalist cause; its lodges were centers of revolutionary sentiment, some even including in their oaths of initiation a pledge to fight for independence.

After 1898 the rationalist viewpoint prevailed, particularly in the matter of the secularization of education and the separation of Church and State. Freemasonry, while nominally retaining its political ideals, lost its revolutionary purpose. Its members, "leaders in the Army of Liberation", became increasingly conservative.

⁶"People in rural areas could not get a bridge repaired or a culvert fixed unless the commanding officer in the area . . . was also fixed." (White 1959: 148).

The lodges remained active, but their purposes were those of other middle-sector associations, principally the establishment of personal contacts. When an army general was a Mason a disproportionate number of his subordinate officers became Masons also. Similar transformations overcame the *Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País*, founded in 1791 to serve the cause of enlightened progress but in the twentieth century staid in the extreme; and, in the 1930's, the urban labor unions, who developed a highly conservative interest in Batista's corporate state. Their opposition to the new radicalism of Castro and others lasted until the moment of Batista's collapse.

The revolution of 1958 was the first to challenge the entire basis of Cuban social structure, particularly the political definition of the two-class division. In earlier revolutions middle sector insurgents implicitly accepted the paternalist concept of the role of the upper class (*los dirigentes, hombres responsables*) as managers of the government and of the country, in the interests of but without the participation of the lower class (*las clases populares, más humildes*). This concept also defined the role of the intellectual and the man of culture, inseparably part of the upper class ideal. In 1959 many of Castro's supporters supposed that the same concept would be retained, that society would be rebuilt on the old foundations. Since the sacking of President Urrutia Castro has emphasized not only education but re-education, meaning the inculcation of a new concept of society. Whether the society which emerges will in fact be much different from the old remains to be seen.

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AN INTERPRETATION OF TARAHUMARA INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS¹

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INTRODUCTION

This paper presents an interpretation of some basic characteristics of Tarahumara behavior and temperament in relation to certain aspects of social organization and to variable situational factors. It considers Zingg's (1942) interpretative treatment of Tarahumara culture to be a rather one-sided positive assessment which, though not incorrect in pointing out the existence of integrative and highly adaptive structural features, misses many crucial issues that appear when the full range of *actual behavior* is taken into account. Zingg stresses the suitability of agricultural and herding practices to the physical environment, the lack of apparent food anxieties, the lack of concepts of an uncontrollable or excessively freakish nature, or a cruel supernatural world, and finally, that social life combines mutual work-aid with recreation and sociability. His analysis does not put strong emphasis upon indications of marked variability of economic resources from family to family, anxieties in the realm of interpersonal relations (jealousy, desertion, slanderous gossip, sorcery, etc.), projections of violence, and rejection of group-centered obligations, that are described in this paper.

Some further materials are also offered to help explain those striking characteristics of Tarahumara behavior described by Passin (1942): the prevarication patterns; the curious projections and exaggerated fear of aggression, and the existence of fear and distrust among children toward parents, especially foster parents. (Passin, 1943)

In sum, it is an appraisal of Tarahumara culture from the point of view of interpersonal relations. It focuses on ranges of behavior spilling beyond the descriptive categories of ordinary ethnographic reporting, and attempts to describe the patterning and texture of interpersonal processes.

¹Field work was carried out with the aid of a Viking Fund Fellowship (1951) and a grant from the Department of Anthropology of Yale University.

BRIEF OUTLINE OF TARAHUMARA CULTURE

The Tarahumara live in the southwestern corner of Chihuahua, Mexico, in the Sierra Madre Mountains, and number some 45,000. They are a remarkably well preserved example of tribal culture maintaining essential aboriginal integrity in the twentieth century. The major European elements included in their culture are over three hundred years old, having been introduced by Jesuit missionaries at that time, and they are now well tailored by reintegration into an over-all Tarahumara cultural framework. They live in *rancherías* scattered over a mountainous terrain. There is a great deal of seasonal mobility, generally, a movement from the highlands to the canyons in the winter, and to scattered small agricultural plots in late spring and summer. The basic socioeconomic unit is the nuclear family. The *ranchería* is a local group that by being a focal center of work-feast communal parties and religious ceremonies, offsets the essential isolation and near self-sufficiency of the individual households. The *pueblo* is a political and territorial unit that includes all the *rancherías* in a radius of 15 square miles. The *pueblo* has a series of native officials, known by such Spanish names as *gobernador*, *mayor*, *capitán*, and *soldado*, whose functions are to regulate behavior, adjudicate disputes, punish offenders, and organize and carry out the *pueblo*-wide religious ceremonials.

METHODOLOGY

The field procedure of gathering data followed the suggestion of Hoebel and Llewelyn (1941) that in the conflict situation one can see ideal norms of the group in action, and the situations that give rise to conflict. Examples of conflict situations (e.g. divorces, desertion, theft, accusations of gossip, sorcery, physical assault, etc.) were collected by: 1) direct observation of family and *ranchería* life over a period of eight months; 2) questioning native officials whose specific task it is to prevent, if possible, or punish breaches of the ideal norms of conduct; 3) witnessing formal adjudications of interpersonal conflicts and crime; 4) obtaining responses to a T.A.T.-like picture test, showing Tarahumara in tense or angry postures. (Fried 1954)

STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES AND INTERPERSONAL STRESSES IN
THE NUCLEAR FAMILY

The Tarahumara family can very nearly, and at times actually does, function as an autonomous social and economic unit. It is within the nuclear family that land is owned and tilled, animals reared and sold, and most articles of household goods and clothing made. This socio-economic unit, since it is made up of but two principle figures, (the husband and wife,) who must between them carry out the basic life-ensuring tasks, is peculiarly vulnerable to disturbances on several possible counts. Firstly, the spouses may be emotionally incompatible, a condition that soon interferes with efficient task performance. Secondly, death and disease, by carrying off or incapacitating any single member, has more catastrophic consequences on the total household than is the case in an extended household. Finally, there is the actual physical isolation of Tarahumara life. There are no villages, only scattered *rancherías*, and most families own small plots of land in two or more widely dispersed locations. The herding of goats and sheep demands seasonal migration from summer highland to winter canyon sites. This necessitates the separation of the spouses and even the older offspring for long periods of time. It is not uncommon for every member of the family to spend many days in separate parts of the countryside.

It would be an obvious fallacy to blame the nuclear family *structure* for various failures to meet economic, social or emotional needs. One certainly does find examples of household units that are successful arrangements; these households consist of a healthy and vigorous husband-wife team, well mated and pleased with each other, with sufficient land and animals to support them, and with several healthy children. But, for example, in one *ranchería* of some twelve households, seven showed signs of interpersonal frictions that impaired work-performance.

Space does not permit the analysis of the causes in each case of the impairment, but several general *situational* as opposed to *structural* factors can be isolated: that is to say in these cases the households consisted of a husband, wife and children; a full complement.

1. Friction can arise over the actual incompetence of a spouse, with no initial ill-will as the cause of the incompetence. The iso-

lated character of Tarahumara life produces frequent instances of young girls or boys insufficiently socialized to permit capable handling of the emotional or practical commitments of marriage (though the practice of temporary matrilocal residence obviously functions to overcome this unhappy possibility).

2. A widow or widower remarries and wishes to bring her or his children to live in the household over the objections (overt or covert) of the new marriage partner. The Tarahumara often resent, for both psychological and economic reasons, the burden of caring for someone else's children. Some years ago a terrible smallpox epidemic decimated many families, leaving some hundreds of orphans. Several native officials independently described how they were unable to persuade even relatives to take these children. Many were given, finally, to Mestizo families as servants.

3. Spouses can be badly matched temperamentally, though both are good workers, and they are economically quite secure. This produces a situation of considerable ambivalence, as there is a conflict of economic and personal motives.

4. Spouses can be very attached to each other emotionally, but suffer from a poverty of economic resources. This sets up grave pressures, often necessitating breaking up the family unit: the husband may then leave to work for Mestizos and the wife may be forced to take her children and live with relatives or beg food from neighbors.

TACTICS AND STYLE OF INNER-FAMILY CONFLICT

The Tarahumara life-style is one in which the *quality* of interpersonal relations is of critical importance as a determinant of actual behavior. Simply knowing the ideal norms that govern behavior in a given situation is often a poor guide to predicting an actual course of action. However, the observer will eventually come to recognize that the range of choices of courses of action falls within certain limits, and therefore are cultural, not personal inventions. Nevertheless, the choice itself between alternatives is often a deeply individualized and contingent one—contingent on personality and the exact situation.

As a rule, the Tarahumara are remarkably conscious of the ideal standards of behavior. These are recounted to them on

every social and ceremonial occasion by native officials, so that any adult can state in nearly identical words what is expected of a man, woman, or child in terms of domestic duties, mutual assistance, generosity, care of property, and so on. However, by a research procedure that investigated precisely those cases in which the ideal norms were *not followed*, it became clear that sometimes the Tarahumara would deliberately violate the overtly approved standards of behavior. The attendant disturbance was actually sought. That is to say, the "culture" is being manipulated by the individual for highly personal ends. This is not an instance of choosing a deviant behavior pattern, but of deliberately, though necessarily in a disguised form, violating the socially sanctioned version of behavior.

For example; all property is individually owned. Every one in the family knows to whom each article of clothing and every cooking utensil belongs. They also know full well to whom the grain or animals belong. This recognition implies the ultimate right of the owner to dispose of such property. The man who wants to annoy his wife can sell one of her blankets without consulting her; this to provoke her. It is the provocation of a dispute which is the underlying objective of his action; the economic aspect of the sale is not the main issue.

Our purpose is not to analyze individual cases, but from a wide range of typologically different conflict situations to find typical strategies that occur again and again; to reach the stage of patterning on the level of interpersonal strategy.

There is a certain rhythm of deteriorating husband-wife relationships which seems to emerge from the study of scores of cases of interpersonal friction. In general, the Tarahumara prefer the strategy of *withdrawal* in its various forms; physically, by running away; psychologically, by an attitude of indifference or sullen, hostile silence. But there are cases in which an individual may not be able to withdraw by desertion, and to maintain a sullen silence too long (for a man) or to be overly shrewish (for a woman) is to risk being accused of being "ill-tempered" and thereby be exposed to the criticism of the social group. In this case, the strategy of finding a concrete issue upon which to force the situation to a crisis is a distinct device for letting off steam. Therefore, many cases that come before native officials are really secondary, or screening considerations that shield the underlying

motive: the attempt to find a culturally forceful ground for dissolving the marriage.

While outright desertions and divorce proceedings are dramatic and cases are thus easy to find, such examples are not so profoundly productive of insights into Tarahumara strategies of interpersonal relations as is the situation in which both spouses are discontented though not quite to the extent of wishing a direct and open break. Because the "modal personality" of the Tarahumara displays an ego-centered, sensitive, individualized orientation toward life there is a strong tendency for them to seek relief by withdrawal. Where actual desertion does not occur, a series of other indirect tactics are employed, especially those that leave open the possibility of reconciliation. The woman becomes sullen and withdrawn, careless about housework, forgetful, slow to prepare food, or neglectful in the care of her husband's clothes. The husband may "forget" to tell his wife about a drinking party and goes alone. He may claim to lack the money to buy cloth or salt, and then refuse to sell one of *his* goats to get the necessary funds. In such a phase, both parties are provocatively skirting on the brink of overt conflict, for already ideal norms are being challenged.

In a worsening phase, there is, finally, overt neglect of sex-linked tasks on one or both sides. The woman may then nag the man unmercifully (the sound of an irate Tarahumara woman upbraiding a man is something every Tarahumara investigator has commented upon, for it is so distinctive in its tonalities and virility). She not only accuses him of various breaches of proper behavior, but adds heated warnings that she will certainly call the native officials to discipline him. The man can counter with similar warnings and threats. Such threats to bring the non-conforming member before a public tribunal has considerable power in Tarahumara culture. Public shaming is greatly respected and feared as a punishment.

Finally, if matters have reached the true crisis point, the Tarahumara will, according to the analysis of available case histories, choose one of several foci (themes) of special intense emotional involvement in which to couch the attack. These are: 1) property, its misuse, loss, or misappropriation; 2) adultery; 3) desertion; 4) insults (The use of such ego-diminishing epithets

in public as "lazy-one," "robber," "adulterer"); 5) physical assault.

No matter what the real cause is of the inability of the marriage partners to live together, and they can be multiple, the expressed cause of the rupture is always some culturally recognized area of critical sensitivity. In a collection of over sixty cases of inner-family disputes, plus sixty-five cases of formal adjudication by native officials, it was found that the overtly expressed causes were limited to the above set of culturally stereotyped complaints. This is not to say that such grievances as adultery, nonconformance of work-tasks, and loss of property through negligence can not in themselves directly cause severe frictions; indeed they do, but beyond that, when difficulties arose from still other sources, they were expressed through such actions, or were twisted or interpreted as though they were instances of such actions.

A concrete example of this would be the case of Juan who married a lovely young girl, but one who had little or no economic resources to bring into the marriage. Later, Juan's meeting with a "rich" widow coincided with his discovery of his wife's lack of capacity to cook, sew or be watchful of his property. By steady provocation, he built a case of culturally accepted faults against her and got a divorce. He soon married the widow.

WIDE SITUATIONAL VARIABILITY AND THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN APPLYING IDEAL NORMS

The need for flexibility and improvisation of behavior due to situational variability in Tarahumara culture results in a basically non-rigid attitude toward many ideal norms, which are at times ignored or violated. Native *gobernadores*, officials whose duty it was to preach and enforce conformity to socially-sanctioned good behavior, furnished examples of dramatic violations that were not punished, thereby giving insight into the implicit, though non-verbalized, philosophy of Tarahumara law. (Fried, 1954)

A woman appeared before a *gobernador* I was at that time interviewing, demanding that he command her son and daughter to cease "living together as man and wife," and that they be forced to seek other mates and not shame her. This is indeed a violation of ideal norms that should deserve

stern punishment. I asked the gobernador what he intended to do, and was astonished at his reply: "I know these people. Who would want to marry them? The boy is almost crippled and the daughter is shy and stupid and ill-tempered."

An examination of this case disclosed that this was an unhappy, isolated family, even more so than usual, with the children unused to seeing strangers; never attending fiestas or gatherings. The ideal norms were indeed being broken, but then, the people involved represented special cases. There was no punishment.

While investigating family composition, cases were discovered of households where the mother had died and the husband never remarried; one of the daughters became the surrogate wife and "mother" to the younger children. Such daughters may never marry. They seem shy, fear men, and are deeply attached to their fathers. Two instances were recorded of sisters who were living alone, refusing all suitors, doing all the work-tasks of men with great competence, including ox-plowing and tree felling.

SOME OUTSTANDING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TARAHUMARA TEMPERAMENT

The variability of situation from household to household, in terms of composition and psychological adjustment, in terms of economic resources, in terms of physical or emotional isolation of its members, and the consequent broad differences in the degree or quality of the socialization of children, give a special flavor to Tarahumara culture and provide some leads to the understanding of many outstanding features of their temperament. The materials offered here, however, can in no way substitute for intensive psychological studies of personality which have yet to be carried out.

1. There is an extreme sensitivity or touchiness on the part of Tarahumara of both sexes and at any age to any form of rebuke. In fact, to rebuke someone is considered as a form of punishment. Spouses will desert if too harshly criticized, and even small children run away from home, often for days. Native officials know that the threat of a public rebuke alone is usually sufficient to correct behavior. Mexican school teachers have learned that a very

mild (by Mestizo standards) scolding in the classroom means the child will refuse to appear again.

2. There is an attempt to protect one's resources by hiding them so as not to be exposed to the risk of giving food or lending animals. No matter how rich a Tarahumara may be, his dress, house and surrounding are quite "standard." Here we touch on the Tarahumara secretiveness and culturally patterned protective prevarication; e.g. giving wrong names, lying about where one is going or what one intends to do. (Passin, 1942)

3. General suspicion of all strangers is, of course, at least partly explained by the isolation factor. Suspicion and fear of Mestizos has an additional historical basis. (See Champion, (1955) for an account of culture contact and acculturation.) A stranger arriving at a Tarahumara household is apt to find no one, apparently, at home. He is either being carefully watched from some hidden corner within the house or from some convenient blind near the house. The scattering of family members over the mountains due to herding and agricultural activities is a factor in understanding the sensitivity of Tarahumara to theft.

4. The Tarahumara sense of balance in the give and take of interpersonal relations is marked. Husbands and wives seem to weigh each others contributions. When one partner feels that the other's contribution is not equal to his own tactics of stalling or nagging are the result. Above all else, the Tarahumara hates to be taken advantage of. The Tarahumara ego is easily bruised.

5. The Tarahumara seem to over-react to the threat of physical violence. In ideal culture, the Tarahumara must *never* use corporal punishment, this being the sole prerogative of the native officials. Evidence for the existence of a highly ambivalent feeling toward physical violence, with strong overt controls over such behavior, comes from the observation of numerous incipiently hostile interpersonal situations where the movement of interaction builds to a climax, yet stops, somehow, short of blows.

Space does not permit the development of an explanation of this feature of Tarahumara behavior based on conflicting value orientations: the Jesuit Spanish culture stressing meek, cooperative peacefulness, as against the ancient aggressive trends of Uto-Aztecan aboriginal culture and personality.

THE CLASH BETWEEN GROUP AND INDIVIDUALISTIC
ORIENTATIONS

At times a precarious tension arises between individualistic and ego-centered values and feelings, and group-centered duties and obligations. The nuclear family is to a large extent an independent socio-economic unit, but it often does require the intermittent, yet significant aid of neighbors and relatives. The same weaknesses that threaten the functional unity of spouses, reappear in the interrelations of households of a *ranchería*. Mutual work-aid, occasional lending of food or oxen, or caring for children and other such reciprocal activities can be disrupted by interpersonal conflict. Cooperation is always on a *voluntary* basis and can be withdrawn. Many examples of lapses from morally sanctioned economic reciprocity were recounted by native officials, who sadly stated they had, tirelessly, to teach the people to behave "correctly."

These officials, who are the guardians of group-centered values, sometimes found it necessary to apply strong moral (public shaming) pressures to coax the pueblo-members to assist others with food or animals. They were not always successful. In some cases Tarahumara were forced by threat of punishment to assume the costly honors of being nominated as a ceremonial official, or dance leader in important pueblo religious fiestas. Economic reasons were by no means the only ones for such reluctance; some people did not wish to expend the time.

CONCLUSIONS

Tarahumara culture is interpreted as one in which many aspects of life situations can suddenly become highly uncertain, or unstable, and these factors must be included in seeking the causes for high levels of suspicion, hostility and insecurity feelings. True, at a higher level of organization—the pueblo, with its native officials, and the *ranchería*, with its communal work-religious fiestas—Tarahumara culture appears to me, as it did to Zingg (op. cit.), to be an admirable working arrangement. The culture is not threatened with disintegration. But, at the interpersonal level, difficulties and conflicts arise that cannot be avoided, and only from a study of this level do these phenomena emerge.

The difference between Zingg's position and my own probably stems from differences in the levels of observation, and not from disagreement on major cultural outlines. Bennett (1946) reviewed a somewhat similar disagreement over the fundamental nature of Pueblo culture (Southwest United States) between Thompson, who saw it as a fine, harmonious, integrated culture, and Goldfrank, who saw it as a difficult culture—one which produced tensions, anxieties and psychosomatic disorders in the individual members, who were pressed into conforming to group needs and values. These apparently contradictory positions, according to Bennett, were not actually mutually exclusive. At the community level, Pueblo society is a wonderfully integrated socio-cultural system, but the individual member did have to pay a price for the maintenance of such a system.

In Tarahumara culture, factors of isolation, structural weakness of the nuclear family, conflict between opposed individual and group-centered values, and inadequate socialization of children, all contribute to the difficulties.

Finally, the values of the imposed Jesuit-Spanish culture are, at times, in conflict with, or at least poorly integrated with the aboriginal culture, which stressed more aggressive, individualistic orientations.

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XAIBE—A MAYAN ENCLAVE IN NORTHERN BRITISH HONDURAS

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The history of the Maya Indians in Central America up to the time of the conquest of Yucatan by the Spaniards in the middle of the sixteenth century is a story of migration from north to south and from south to north. For whether the original home of the Maya people was in northern Yucatan, or south in Honduras and Guatemala, the fact remains that in their frequent trekking over vast territories from their sacred city of Chichen-Itza to Copan in Honduras and to Guatemala in the south, they had to pass through a region now known as Belize or British Honduras.

British Honduras is a Crown Colony of Great Britain, lying between Yucatan on the north, the Caribbean Sea on the east, and Guatemala on the southwest.

The student of Mayan antiquity will not find much of archeological and anthropological value in British Honduras in comparison with the magnificent finds made in Yucatan, in Honduras, and in Guatemala. For in the latter regions are found the magnificent ruins of Chichen-Itza, Uxmal, the splendid ball-court in Copan, Honduras, and the wonderfully well-preserved stelae of Quiragua in eastern Guatemala.

Fortunately, too, for the northern region, we have the splendid historic record of the much maligned and much lauded Bishop Diego de Landa in his great historic work, "*Relación de las Cosas de Yucatan*." Practically all writers on the Mayan region have drawn from this treasure-trove of ancient Mayan lore.

It seems that, in their journeys through British Honduras, whether northward or southward, the Mayas did not delay long enough to establish large cities like Mayapan in Yucatan and Chichen-Itza. But there are unmistakable evidences of Mayan culture in the various Mayan enclaves in British Honduras. Besides Xaibe (the "X" in all Mayan words is pronounced like "sh") there are Mayan settlements known as Pachakan, Succotz, San Romas, San Antonio, Paraiso, and San Narciso. The unmistakable evidence of Mayan culture in all these enclaves is found in the numerous existing artifacts—arrowheads, broken pottery,

figurines, and occasional inscriptions. The only larger ruins which still await further investigation are near the village of Benque Viejo, on the western edge of the colony near Guatemala. But the ascent to these ruins is quite difficult on account of the bushes and trees lining the pathway up to the ruins. A party of archeologists intends to survey these ruins.

The social life of the Maya Indians as described by Bishop de Landa may still be observed in many features in the life of the Maya Indians of today in all the afore-mentioned villages. The Bishop refers to the prevalence of drunkenness among the Indians of his day and mentions the trouble the Maya Indian women had in escorting their husbands home after they had imbibed the intoxicating liquor or *balche* which was used on all festive occasions.

The word "Xaibe" means a "junction," and it is generally believed that Xaibe was established at the latter part of the eighteenth century. At present there are about two hundred and fifty people living there including school children. Both school children and adults speak Maya. The average family has about four or five children, but quite a few die in their infancy. Agriculture is practically the same as it was at the time of the coming of the Spaniards. Maize is the staple food, and every family has its *milpa* or cornfield. The work of the men is practically confined to working these fields. They get up early in the morning, sometimes as early as four or five o'clock, and supply themselves with a number of tortillas made that same morning or the night before by the wife. The men spend the whole day in the fields and return about four or five in the afternoon, sitting down to a frugal meal of tortillas or corncake, chili, and occasionally an egg. The tortilla or pancake is used as a spoon to convey the rest of the food to the mouth.

The meagre meal referred to above is often enriched by the product of the hunt. The deer is still found and so is the *tepezcuittle* (a small wild hog), which the Indians say is "muy sabrosa."

The *milpa* system of agriculture, which consists in burning off the corn stubble at a certain time of the year and then finding another field for sowing their important staple, maize, has sometimes been blamed for the occasional famine which arises in the villages. They all use the machete. Every adolescent boy has his machete and is very proud when he can hang it on his belt for

the first time. The machete, a long, sharp knife, is a *sine qua non* in the outdoor life of the Maya Indian. With it he hacks his way through the bush; defends himself against venomous snakes, and in time of quarrel uses it as a mighty destructive weapon. The venomous snake, which still abounds, is the *fer de lance*.

In time of sickness practically all the Indians, even those who have been well schooled in the Catholic religion, prefer to visit the *curandero* (medicine man) in preference to the colonial doctor. They have numerous magic formulas, both for the healing of diseases and as invocations to the deity. The *curandero* uses prayers in Maya imploring the evil spirits to leave the sick person alone. The spirits are commonly called in Maya "Nugoostutuobo" (Big Fathers), who take care of all the bush on earth.

The religion of the people in all of the villages referred to is Catholic, since the Jesuit Fathers have been working among them for three quarters of a century. They hold fast to the religion taught to them by the missionaries even though strong opposition has developed during the last three decades by the efforts of Protestant sects, notably the Seventh Day Adventists. But thus far the people have held fast to the old doctrine. Like the Mexicans, they have a strong devotion to the Virgin of Guadalupe and honor her with the fine epithet: "Kitchpan colei" (Beautiful Lady). The missionaries have always been wise in their conduct towards their neophytes, never blaming them too much for keeping up their old dances and customs, but inveighing strongly against the excessive use of liquor and their system of concubinage.

A Maya man can marry any woman of the village, but there are occasions when difficulties crop up, especially if his choice is a young lady belonging to a family of good standing; however, the young lady generally elopes with the young man and they marry. Then after six months or so the bride and groom return to the girl's parents' home, kneel down and fervently apologize for having married without their consent. This is sometimes followed by a drinking party, in order to drown the past offense. There are times, too, when the mother of the bride flogs the girl before complete forgiveness is assured.

The late Dr. Sylvanus G. Morley who will be remembered for many years to come as the chief authority on the life, culture, and archeology of the ancient Maya, loved the people with whom he

had so long been associated. He and his wife lived with a Maya-speaking family near Merida, Yucatan, and therefore whatever he has written, especially on the culture of the present-day Maya, bears the stamp of authenticity. He had friends throughout all Maya land. When he died in Santa Fe, New Mexico, several years ago and when the news came to Yucatan, the bells of the churches were rung in honor of their late friend and protector, "Señor Morley."

What Morley did in our days to make the land of the learned Mayas known to all the world, John L. Stevens did in 1840 through his highly interesting book, "Travels in Yucatan and Central America," illustrated by Catherwood. Hence there is little wonder that in 1940 many patriotic societies of Latin America celebrated the centenary of the publication of this work by means of special commemoration. In fact, Stevens has done for all of Central America what Charles S. Lummis has done for our own historic Southwest, New Mexico and Arizona, through his many books, chiefly "The Spanish Pioneers."

Both Stevens and Morley refer to the many superstitions of the Maya Indian. These strange beliefs still exist today, for they have a strong conviction that the little men of the bush and forest, the *duendes*, still exist, either to help or to molest village inhabitants. My chief informant, Schoolmaster Peter Avila of Orange Walk, tells me that those who believe in *duendes* are a limited few, but very often they relate stories about them whenever they gather together for an evening of diversion.

Another vestige of pre-Spanish times is the post-harvest practice of cooking some green corn, placing it in the bush and hiding it well, so that the bush spirits can enjoy the sweet flavor of the corn. This is done to please the spirits, so that the harvest may be more productive from year to year. One finds this custom not only in Xaibe but in all the other villages of northern British Honduras mentioned above.

Considering the extent of Maya territory from Xaibe in the north to San Antonio in the south, it is not surprising that dialectic differences exist in the language spoken in the various Maya enclaves. The language of San Antonio especially has its own peculiarity not found in the languages of the north. Many of the older Mayas have not even learned to speak Spanish, and, as a conse-

quence, whenever the Xaibe folk are involved in legal difficulties and their cases are heard in the court of Corozal, two miles distant, a Maya interpreter is generally provided by the alcalde or judge.

A practice well known to anthropologists who have studied the social organization of primitive peoples, namely cross-cousin marriage, is not found among the Mayas. Nor is there any other kind of preferential mating or a division into clans. Totemism seems to be absent; at least I could find no vestige of the practice among any of the Indians of the northern region.

As for the mentality of the Maya children, it may be said that their ability at memory work is excellent. They know many hymns and songs both in Spanish and English by heart and are eager to recite them whenever a visitor comes to their school. Parents are eager to have their children attend regularly, though at times, whenever the family needs a few extra pennies, some of the little girls walk two miles over a terrible road to Corozal to sell a few oranges carried in their little baskets.

Speaking of children brings up the practice of *Hetz-mek*, which might be called the coming-of-age ceremony. According to Fr. Lalin who was curé of San Roman, a village somewhat distant from Xaibe, this practice was very much in vogue among his people. At a certain period in the life of a young female child she was carried astride the hip of the mother and shown the various utensils she would need later on in the fulfillment of her duties as wife and mother. This practice is also well observed in the neighboring Corozal district and at Orange Walk. Strong and soft drinks are offered to the limited number of invited guests whenever there is a *Hetz-mek* celebration. Other occasions which call the people of the tribe together for festive rejoicing are the birth of a child and the building of a new home. People are very cooperative in the latter work and gladly go into the bush to chop down logs for the erection of a new house. On these occasions, good liquor or *balche* passes freely among the company.

Returning to the question of marriage, it is necessary to observe that points much stressed by many anthropologists in chapters on social organization, namely privileged familiarity, joking-relationships, and the calling of a father's brother by the name of father do not exist in this region—in Xaibe and other villages of northern

British Honduras. Nor is there any division of individuals into special groups, like clans or moieties.

The second large native element in British Honduras is constituted by the Caribs. They have their own language and are practically all Catholic. They are not easily weaned from Catholicism as is sometimes the case with the Mayas and the Spanish-speaking Ladinos.

As to the relationship between Mayas and Caribs, we may say that the former are prejudiced against the latter, though lately a few Caribs have married with Maya girls. A few orphaned Maya children are now being raised by Caribs, and instead of speaking Maya they speak Carib.

